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IMPACT 1967: PROSPECTING FOR THE NEGRO LAWYER
AS SOCIAL ARCHITECT
Alfred T. Lile
Over the entrance to the Supreme Court Building in Washington,
carved in stone, are the words "Equal Justice Under Law." We
would like to believe that it is in all respects a reality
In our land, but as we see before us evidences of injustice,
we are forced to the conclusion that those words represent
our goal and not the accomplishment of our times.
--Earl Warren
One of the most significant features of a creative and
progressive social evolution is the growing and salutary
importance which a conscious and rational technique1 tends to
assume in social life. Negro lawyers are less and less pre-
pared to let the wheels of social advancement roll on with-
out their active interference. In keeping with the scienti-
fic spirit of the times, they feel more and more dissatisfied
with experiences based upon individual whims, or upon pre-
conceived legal, philosophical, moral, or social generaliza-
tions.
It is our further observation that the consistent and
meaningful results attained by the rational techniques (sci-
entific technique) of the brain men in the material world
beckon Negro legal social architects to apply some analogous
modus operandi to social change. Man's signal success in
controlling nature advances our confidence that the Negro can
actively influence the social world in a similar fashion.
The Negro lawyer's past Achilles' heel in this area is due,
not to any fundamental limitations of the reasoning process,
but often to his not facing up to the reality of the problem.
While it is realized that nature can be controlled,
changed, or treated in the scientific manner, social change
in terms of such approaches as the architectural tools of
legislation and "moral suasion" also can be approached in the
scientific manner.
2
Perhaps the oldest and most persistent form of archi-
tectural methodology used to change societal structures is
1
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"ordering and forbidding." The alembic of this technique is
to me t an "Impact 1967" crisis by arbitrary acts of the
will, and punishing infractions of the willed decrees by
using arbitrary physical force.4 The primary fallacy inher-
ent in this strategy of social architecturing is that it
often fails to try to find and remove perturbing causes of
social unrest. 5 An example pertinent to this thesis is the
typical legislative procedure so rampant in our court systems
today.
To be sure, it often happens that the legislative and
judicial process brings about effective results. But still,
because the actual cause of the social crisis itself is un-
known, it cannot be controlled or solved by legislation and
court decree alone. 6
Another fallacy, in addition to the legislative one, one
that the Negro lawyer as social architect would do well to
avoid, is the planless empiricism of the "common sense"
method. This technique tries to get at the real cause of a
social crisis by a rather haphazard selection of various
possibilities, directed only by the thrust of a rough and
popular reflex action. The chief underside of this fallacy
has been seen by most of us in some form or the other. Per-
haps the best illustration is the latent and manifest sup-
position that we know "social reality" because we live in it,
and that we can validly assume things and relations as cer-
tain on the basis of our everyday acquaintance with them.
The feeling here resembles that ancient assumption that we
know the physical world because we live in it, and, therefore,
we have the right of generalizing about the world without
special organization and thorough investigation, on the basis
of just plain "common sense." 7
Actually, however vast an individual's sphere of practi-
cal acquaintance with social reality may be as compared with
others, and no matter how many times this virtuosity has been
recast, it is always limited and constitutes only a small
part of the entire complexity of social facts. His social
awareness usually extends over one society, and often over
only one class of that particular society. This we might
call the "outside limitation" of the individual. Due to the
fact that among all his experiences, perhaps the larger part
is left unheeded, and never becomes a basis of common sense
generalization (we call this the inside limitation) we feel
the individual is not an expert in societal activity just
3
because he happens to be a member of a particular society.
Granted the Negro lawyer as social architect must have
some way in the scheme of things to judge social facts, other-
wise how could he serve as a catalytic agent to change the
structure of society. The truth of the matter is that our
personal judgments are only a rough approximation of reality
and mixed with an enormous amount of error. Therefore, it
is hoped the strategies, methods, and techniques of the legal
architect will be geared to a more objective excellence in his
blueprint for developing social change, for the "common sense"
techniques of "I know society because I live in it" stretches
credulity too much to be adequate. Especially significant in
the "common sense" method is the idea of "I know Negroes be-
cause they work for me," or "I know white folks because I mix
with them." The awareness of some that Negroes are "satisfied"
in their present plighted state of societal deprivation be-
cause "my colored maid and my colored chauffeur said so" is
an insight gained at the expense of reality. Does it not
occur they might have feared their employer would dismiss them
had they spoken otherwise? Even if the Negro maid and chauf-
feur parents were satisfied (since most of their lives were
spent in a restrictive society), does it automatically follow
that their offsprings will spontaneously develop the same
attitude?
These fallacies, as stressed earlier, are not always due
to a lack of theoretical ability or serious scientific train-
ing on the part of the lawyer striving for healthy social
change. Rather, they seem to be the consequences of a refusal
to recognize and meet the problems as they are. If we are
willing to frankly and earnestly appraise the injustices ex-
tant in social activity, and to admit that present methods of
social architecturing are no longer adequate, and to replace
them gradually by more efficient ones, a good investment will
be made for all concerned. But a radical adjustment from the
old to the new requires the use of time, doesn't it? This
time element, writes Edmond Cahn, "may be made into an ally
or an enemy, depending on the experience and judgment," and
scientific acumen "one brings to the occasion."8
If Negro lawyers as legal architects are to issue us
forth from our present social commitment to one of advanced
worth, they must, as in the physical sciences, be able to
foresee future situations and prepare for them. Not only
must they be in constant preparation for future crises that
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time's neutral ingredients will bring, but they must have in
stock a large body of secure and objective knowledge capable
of being applied to varied social situations as the need
arises.
Thus far we have proceeded as though the reader and
writer were in good agreement concerning what can best be done
in the Negro lawyer's intelligent participation towards
directing the path of the social order. But before he can
seek to improve the present proximations of justice, he must
attain some fairly clear conviction as to what goals his
scientific architecturing process should be geared. His con-
siderations may take shape in various forms. Certainly
though, intelligent and practical thought about improving the
social fabric should begin with something akin to the assump-
tion that: "Meaningful architecturing is architecturing that
is good for genus homo in his society and in his world."
While it may be difficult to deduce specifics from a for-
mula so general, it does help one to think in some degree
systematically about how law can be shaped scientifically
toward truly social ends. It is hornbook law to say the
Negro lawyer's problems of law-and-society will rarely present
single issues. In fact, many values will surely be involved.
Yet, is It not true that he needs the scientific temper to
face his problems, for is not a measure of the systematic
an alternative to stagnation and chaos? The Negro lawyer as
architect if he is to give purposeful thought as to the route
he must take in present-day law, he must also give purposeful
thought as to the direction and path of past-day law. The
essential thing is not to slough off all the past social
architecturing simply because it has out-lived its usefulness.
Data have shown that much past social architecturing is pre-
tentious, ineffective, and conspicuously unable to meet
present and future patterns of social growth. However
flickering and unsure past social architecture has been, its
work has soundly validated itself as beginning rungs on the
ladder of social development.
It would not be surprising if the reader concluded, up
to this point, that the Negro lawyer has not participated as
a social architect in the past. His relationship in such
matters, to be sure, has been, with some exceptions, largely
limited. How then can he be expected to submit his unique
blueprint for the fashioning of American social culture? We
suggest a minimum of incidents in which he may participate
5
with "optimific" relevance.9
1. If the Negro lawyer-architect believes a statutory or
constitutional provision emastulates the sense of communal
justice, his legal tools of architectural construction should
measure and posit the justice of alternative provisions or
amendments.
2. In his actions to gain right and justice, the "Impact
1967" Negro social architect will see that his new ideas (off-
springs of scientific inventiveness) will "find readier accep-
tance when they" do not have to "break through the disciplined
phalanx of absolute principles" engineered by his predeces-
sors. 10 No longer should he be guilty of an atavistic throw-
back to the old outlook on things. To his new-time scientific
perspective, the festering, polluting underside of the old-
time outlook should be cannon fodder for ultimate disposal.
No longer should he quietly and passively assent to legisla-
tive approval of statutes too extravagant, or too scant with
the public's money. His utility of reflective reasoning,
assimilative genius, and racial pride should take to task the
foreign office whose aggressive financial aid activities in
certain Caucasian affairs, is not at least duplicated in black
nations' affairs.
3. As a reserved pragmatist, seeking the existential
ends of justice, he sometimes will find it necessary, like the
Prophets of old, to cry out fr what Sara Toll East calls
"mighty diastrophic change." Directed by a rational techni-
que, he will not be apologetic for his tireless activities
of emancipating minority groups from the extra-legal taint of
segregation served upon them by an acquiescent white society.
Lynching, unequal poll tax decrees, humiliating marital laws,
and all the other communal consented segregation laws imposed
as it were in apostolic succession--to his way of thinking,
should go! His searchlights of justice-motivated convictions
are constantly scanning our present laws. Our ex post facto
laws of the past, the law abolishing imprisonment for debt,
our present social security laws, laws on marriage, taxation,
wills, and criminal procedure--and unaccountably more--are
continually examined by use of the prevailing concepts of
scientific method.
Even though the lawyer-architect may be somewhat of a
scientific-computer machine, deducing his results from prece-
dents, and statutes, his architectural methodology takes a
6
wayward turn when societal conditions demand abandonment of
stare decisis. Although true, it is not always obvious to
the uninitiated that our laws are often founded on precedents
in prior cases. Yet, time and peculiarity of circumstance
render no two cases entirely alike. Often the lawyer must
compete with his contemporary advocate in trying to convince
the judge his case differs enough to justify a decision that
will unquestionably play a vital part in modifying the social
index.
4. In participating with "optimific" relevance, the
Negro lawyer, armed with the hefty weapons of scientific
method will find himself involved in issues of burning, fight-
ing concern. The incidents that will try his rational tech-
nique, as well as his faith, will often be those issues whose
legal resolve will result in social upheavals upsetting to the
equilibrium of the daily lives of many persons. Should he
resign himself to token involvement just because his legal
stresses and strains result in social upheaval? There is
fruit here for much discussion, debate and chancey guess.
The answer is that if he does not act, his inaction may re-
suit in a deeper restlessness in the structure of society
to have its laws modified or changed. As legal architect,
his struggle for creative social balance is often tested by
that historical enigma of law called statutes. Early In his
legal training he learned that primary terms in statutes are
sometimes vague. As legal architect, he must trek the
wilderness country of their applicability to the contemporary
scene. Vagueness, some hold, was intended so the triers of
law could have elbow room in concretizing the general to the
specific. His architectural advocacy must prove to the judge
that the unclear commands of vague statutes must always be
subsumed under the clearer principles of public policy and
social justice.
Concluding consideration to be added to the scales of
this treatise is that scientific method has never pretended
to be the mouthpiece of divinity. It neither consciously nor
intentionally tries to place in relief the idea that this
rational excursus is the panacea for what ails our society.
While scientific method cannot ascertain the vastness of the
content of "just laws for everyone," it can illuminate the
expansiveness of the germinal ideas within these laws. If
the Negro lawyer, as social architect, is to make an impact
upon year 1967 . . . and those yeared expanses beyond, he
must bring the work of law in society Into clearer, earthy
7
working focus. His burden can be made infinitely lighter, and
society's incertitudes smoother by the enlightening and
liberating persuasiveness of a rational technique.
It is not known with exact thoroughness how this may come
about; the clearest thought we have about it is that even
though the efforts of Negro legal architects in the past may
have been ritualistic, formal, and basically for monetary gain,
presently another vision is entertained. It is assured that
while this vision may never be found by the prospector, one
thing is certain, it can never be wholly lost. Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s witness that we are children in history,
and Howard Thurman's insight that we must "bend with the wind
to keep living,"1 2 these exhortations meet the Negro "Impact
1967" legal architect right where he stands. Many in his
rank are interested in leaving their mark on history but have
inadequate scientific techniques to ground the practical out-
lets of their energy. Others are trapped in the indifference
that has encased the legal profession for such a long time.
If Negro legal minds are to make real progress as architects
of the social world, they must be aroused and made aware of
the necessity for rational technique. The job they have to
do, the organizations through which they must work, the goals
towards which they must strive, all these must become their
preoccupation in Impact year 1967--and beyond.
Footnotes
1. A scientific method of approach.
2. The best related contemporary discussion known to me, that
is presented both vigorously and sympathetically, is the
contribution of Alfred T. Davies, "Law and Morality in
Race Relations," Christian Century (October 13, 1965),
1256-1258.
3. The rationale for this position is that the legislative
procedure can give clear notice to everyone that after a
certain date, rights and obligations will be changed in a
certain way . . ." Law and Sociology, ed. William M.
Evan (New York, 1962), p. 84.
4. Most theories of law either expressly assent, or impliedly
assume that a distinguishing mark of law consists in the
use of coercion or force; i.e. police, troops, dogs,
fines, etc. A justifiable criticism of this position
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is that of Lan L. Fuller, in The Morality of Law, New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964, pp. 95-
151.
5. Lon L. Fuller is very forthright at this point. "What
law must foreseeably do to achieve its aims is something
quite different from law itself." op. cit., p. 108.
6. Ibid., pp. 91-98. Thomas A Cowan is relevant at this
point. He seems to feel the legal discipline and the
social science enterprise go their respective ways,
ignorant of what each has to offer the other. Since each
ranges over vast areas of human behavior, the salient
factor of law need not go its way in ignorance of what
social science may contribute to its understanding of
causes of social crises.
7. An argument applicable here, though on a different topic,
is associated with the name of D. Elton Trueblood. For a
fuller statement of his position on the validation of
human theories, see David Elton Trueblood, Philosophy of
Religion (New York, 1957), pp. 17-18.
8. The Moral Decision (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1956), p. 277.
9. A concept used by Joseph Fletcher to mean optimum rele-
vance. Situation Ethics (Philadelphia, 1966), p. 61.
10. Law in American Society. ed. Sara T. East (New York, 1963)
p. 22.
11. Ibid., p. 112.
12. Deep Is the Hunger (Evanston, 1951), p. 13.
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EMINENT DOMAIN AS IT RELATES TO HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS
Barbara A. Edwards
As the demand of land comes closer to the supply the role
of the law becomes more and more apparent. The American
people, with their great faith in law as a healer of the ills
of society, are already bringing pressure for various changes
in the existing concept. The eminent domain doctrine is one
which gives the sovereign power to take and use private
property for a public use. This paper will concentrate on the
sovereign's use of private property for housing developments
as public use. In addition, it will analyze the exercise of
this doctrine, in terms of the benefits it provides for the
public, especially through housing developments and the
alleged disservice to those private property owners who claim
to be deprived of their property rights.
It is a well-known fact that today's housing problem is
crucial, especially for the poor. As a result, the sovereign
in many jurisdictions have seen fit to provide the necessary
housing for those in need. The exercise of this doctrine has
met great opposition from many. The private property owner
particularly feels affronted and sometimes deprived of his
property rights. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution is frequently referred to as the law which
protects the private property owner's rights. There is no
court that will deny that the private owner's rights are pro-
tected by this Amendment. However, most courts will point out
that this right is limited by the sovereign's power to exer-
cise the right to take. Observation of today's community,
particularly the housing situation, raises questions about the
public profits and accommodations rendered by the exercise of
the eminent domain doctrine.
"The right of eminent domain," said Justice Story, "is
usually understood to be the ultimate right of the sovereign
to appropriate, not only the public property, but the private
property, of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty,
to public purposes."1  Thus the sovereign has the highest and
most exact interest in property. "The eminent domain doctrine
allows the sovereign to use this property whenever the publics
interest requires it for improved conditions of health and
welfare." 2
10
The present century has seen the former dominion of the
property owner give way to what may be termed a division of
property ownership, as between individuals and the community.
It is pertinent to point out that the law of eminent domain
developed during the days when the nation's greatest asset,
was our apparently limitless land resources. Before the pass-
ing of the Frontier, it might realistically be said that an
individual was aggrieved by a taking of his property only in-
sofar as the question of compensation was concerned. It is
also fair to say that, until relatively recently, only the
person whose land was taken, was normally injured by the exer-
cise of eminent domain power.
In the present day American society, the picture is a dif-
ferent one. Land is no longer available in pristine abundance
and it is not accurate to assume that the individual who is
given the theoretical market value of his property will readily
be able to obtain other property of comparable value. It has
been pointed out that the eminent domain doctrine has been
used consistently more in modern times than before, because
of the lack of adequate space and the increased need for more
use of that property which is available for the use of the
public.
The first case in the Supreme Court involving the question
of whether a taking was for a public use was Shoemaker v.
United States (1893).3 It arose out of a proceeding for the
condemnation of certain lands for the purpose of establishing
a public park In the District of Columbia. The high bench was
without difficulty, able to sustain the taking on the ground
that land acquired for such park was plainly being taken for a
public use. What is of interest today, however, is not so
much that obvious holding, as the fact that the Court, at the
very outset of its opinion, could assert: "In the memory of
men now living, a proposition to take private property, with-
out the consent of its owner, for a public park . . . would
have been regarded as a novel exercise of legislative power." 4
The happiness of a state consists in a balance between
authority and liberty. To describe the interplay between
authority and liberty in these terms requires acute percep-
tion. One must recognize that both are essential elements in
the functioning of any polity and that their coexistence must
somehow be reconciled.
Our relationship with things is closely entwined with the
maintenance of our individuality. William Shakespeare said,
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in the Merchant of Venice, "You take my life when you do take
the means whereby I live." 5 In truth, as Justice Field said,
while dissenting in the Sinking Fund Cases, "All history shows
that rights of persons are unsafe where property is insecure.
Protection to one goes with protection to the other; and there
can be neither prosperity nor progress where this foundation
of all just government is unsettled."6 The moment the idea is
admitted into society, that property is not as sacred as the
laws of our society proclaim it to be, anarchy and tyranny
commence.
From contemporary experience, we can see all too clearly
what the result is for personal liberty when rights of
property are abrogated. A society in which both person and
property were to be given their fullest expression is what the
framers of the United States Constitution contemplated. They
realized what too many of their descendants have neglected to
remember: that personal rights and property rights are the
two faces of a single coin--which is the specie of the free
society. "Both human rights and property rights are founda-
tions of our society." 7
The limitations on private ownership is founded on politi-
cal rather than historical foundations. It arises out of the
conflict between the interest of the people in public projects
and the principle of indemnity in the landowner. Reconcilia-
tion cannot be attained between a sovereign's power and an in-
dividual's rights until the law determines the proper place of
each and partitions the field between them, not completely to
exclude one or the other. The attainment of a stable society
can be manifested through a proper balancing of power and
rights, as courts determine whether the constitutional system
is a safeguard of the interest of an individual who is a mem-
ber of the general public. Due process has been applied by
the Supreme Court in countless cases during the past half
century. In applying this guaranty of due process, the courts
demand that a sovereign give a reasonable relationship between
a taking of an individual's property and the public's welfare.
One fundamental limitation in the exercise of the eminent
domain power is that a sovereign cannot take without just com-
pensation to the property owner. The just compensation is
determined by the market value of that particular area, at the
time of the taking. Another limitation upon the right of
eminent domain is that property can be condemned only for a
public purpose. The law related to these limitations now
12
stands as follows:
The United States Constitution, Amendment XIV,
§1, provides that no state shall deprive any per-
son of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
This Amendment was ratified in 1868 and construed in 1896 to
prohibit states from condemning land without giving just com-
pensation.
Many state statutes provide that a property owner can
appeal any action taken regarding his property, if he feels
that his constitutional rights have been violated. It must
be pointed out that the appeal must be based on the law as
provided in the aforementioned Amendment.
The Constitution is more than a framework of government;
it establishes and guarantees rights which it places beyond
political abridgment. Mere provisions for the rights of the
individual do not, at the same time, automaticglly place those
rights beyond the reach of governmental power. Taken liter-
ally, the term "due process" relates to the mode of proceeding
which must be pursued by governmental agencies. Due process
of law, in this sense, denotes proper procedures: regular
allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to
some settled course of judicial proceeding.
"Due process . . . has represented the balance which our
nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of
the individual, and has struck between that liberty and the
demands of organized society."9 Due process prevents the
states from using their power as a mere guise for the depriva-
tion of constitutional rights. Though Justice Field declares,
"This power rests with them, it cannot be admitted that, under
the pretense of providing for the public health or public
welfare, they can encroach upon rights which those amendments
declare shall not be impaired." 10 The power must, in other
words, be used only to secure the public purpose for which it
exists.
The use and purpose for which property is taken is, in
large part, academic, in view of the broad range now given by
the courts to the concept of public use or purpose. The
courts have been obliged to recognize that the need of the
twentieth century society to acquire property is not
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necessarily as limited as that of its agricultural predecessor
of a century earlier. The development from the narrow con-
ception of public use to the broad view which equates it with
public welfare has mirrored the development of the modern
society itself. "As might be expected," a state court pointed
out, "the more limited application of the principle appears in
the earlier cases, and the more liberal application has been
rendered necessary by complex conditions due to recent
developments of civilization and the increasing density of
population."1 1
There has been serious question about the public nature
of housing, slum-clearance, and urban development, when the
employment of eminent domain power is an adjunct to private
enterprise. The Congress enacted the National Industrial
Recovery Act in 1933, which contained provisions granting the
government the righ to engage in housing, slum-clearance, and
urban development. This provision made it possible for city
planners to have great influence in determining how the emi-
nent domain doctrine is to be used.
Public housing has been historically viewed as a public
use for diverse political reasons. In the 1930's public hous-
ing was intended for families who voluntarily sought to
improve their housing but could not afford private rentals.
While this group of people was regarded as dependent, some
housing authorities accepted public assistance recipients to
a limited extent and other housing authorities would not
accept any. In the 1940's, the program was redirected to pro-
vide housing for war workers. Following the Housing Act of
1949, public housing was oriented again to poor families with
a difference, partly because post-war amendments gave priority
to families having the most urgent housing need, to the aged,
and to those displaced by urban renewal. This third genera-
tion in public housing contains a high concentration of de-
pressed, untutored, and dependent families. The hard fact is
that profit making incentives run counter--so far as the
maintenance of housing is concerned--to the best interests of
the poor. Condemnation procedures are combined with the
peculiarly vulnerable situation of those who 19re poor having
to pay the most profit for the worst housing.
The most serious political distortion of planning occurs
at the site selection stages where sites offered by the local
authority must be evaluated in terms of the racial composition
of the prospective project occupants. In many communities,
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racial minority groups are land-bound within areas restricted
by the existence of racial covenants on underdeveloped as well
as developed areas. The result is excessive overcrowding in
the slum and blighted areas with which the basic purposes of
the low-rent public housing program are concerned. Repercus-
sions upon the program are extensive obstacles to the location
of racial minorities outside of the areas to which they are
restricted necessitates site selection for developments to
house such groups within these inordinately overcrowded
areas. 14 At the same time, the excessive overcrowding tends
to increase the cost of the land. Moreover, there is the
danger of increasing the density of other restricted and over-
crowded areas which must absorb the racial minority group
families temporarily or permanently displaced from similar
areas by public housing developments. In many cases, alterna-
tive housing cannot be provided at all without demolition of
units already occupied and desperately needed as the only
shelter available to the racial minority groups.
The city planners, in their concentration upon the physi-
cal and financial aspects, have succeeded thus far in escaping
the issues related to eminent domain (a thing they do at real
peril to the announced objectives of city planning). Those
public agencies and institutions concerned with development
and operation of housing cannot even pass the discussion
stages before they are confronted with the complicated neces-
sity of finding more space for more people.
Housers and city planners have a choice of two courses of
action. They can attempt to treat each taking of property as
an individual case, or they can approach the problem by
planning for the total community. The latter approach is more
in line with those concerned with city improvement and urban
planning. In using the latter approach, city planners can
concentrate upon establishing a more democratic use of the
eminent domain doctrine.
The eminent domain doctrine when used for the purpose of
housing development has often carried a threat to good hous-
ing. It has been used as a guise for displacing minorities
from desirable areas, and it has frequently been the instru-
ment for breaking up established neighborhoods. Finally, and
equally disasterous, the doctrine has been used to reduce,
even further, the already inadequate supply of living space.
Recent developments in Washington, D. C., illustrates how
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the eminent domain doctrine was used as an instrument for re-
ducing the land space available. This result was accomplished,
according to the Interim Report of the Study Committee of the
Emergency Committee on Housing in Metropolitan Washington,
through the displacement of residents incident to the develop-
ment of public and private housing and related facilities.
Most of the land involved was acquired by public bodies in
accordance with studies and recommendations of the planning
agencies. These same public agencies controlled the con-
demnation procedures but took no responsibility for seeing
that adequate living area and facilities were provided for the
people displaced. 15
T. H. Reed, a leader in the movement for metropolitan
government, said that "City planners, political scientists
and lawyers . . . have poured out millions of words . . . on
the same theme, but frankness requires me to say that so far
we have accomplished little more than a world's record of
words used in proportion to cures effected."l 6 This lack of
accomplishment is indicative of underlying political com-
plexities which are seldom appreciated fully by the proponents
of plans for metropolitan consolidation and other forms of
urban integration.
A common complaint is that the legal powers of the cities
are insufficient to permit effective administration of hous-
ing programs. Those who make this complaint demand that
cities be given a greater degree of home rule. Despite the
demands for greater home rule by city officials (which in
many cases is less a program than a slogan), and despite the
genuine impediments to discretion that exist in many places,
examination of statutes and constitutional provisions demon-
strates that some states have endowed their larger cities with
powers adequate to enable them to carry on effective housing
programs. At the end of 1957, forty-six states had enacted
legislation permitting local governments to participate, com-
pletely or partially, in Federal housing and urban-renewal
programs.
In a recent report, the Urban Renewal Study Board of
Baltimore observed that the city has very broad and compre-
hensive powers with which to carry out the urban-renewal
program. These powers were not described in legislation re-
lated to urban renewal, because the legislation was enacted
prior to the time when the concept of urban renewal emerged.
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Oscar C. Brown of Chicago, formerly manager of the Ida B.
Wells Homes and Attgelt Gardens, has made an interesting pro-
posal to facilitate maximum participation of present occupants
of areas to be redeveloped. In addition to the steps needed
to assure their acceptance as tenants, his proposal is in-
tended to provide for present occupants taking part as devel-
opers. This would be facilitated by the organization of re-
development corporations by present occupants of areas to be
redeveloped. Such corporations would have preference for land
acquired for redevelopment, thereby offering present owners as
well as tenants an opportunity to remain in the area. 1 7
There is ominous significance in the use of the eminent
domain doctrine today because it is a direct causal factor in
the population movements that threaten to make many central
cities into lower class ethnic islands. These islands exist
because the people who live in them have low incomes and be-
cause they are excluded, frequently by illegal means, from
other sections of the cities and from the suburbs. The con-
sequences of this movement on the cultural, political, and
business life of the nation are undesirable. In addition,
"the exercise of eminent domain power has made certain areas
unattractive to upper and middle class groups and in many in-
stances has forced the poorer groups to live in areas which
they cannot afford or want."
In non-partisan Milwaukee, Mayor Frank P. Zeidler recently
complained that "influential suburbanites--leaders of in-
dustry, of business, and real estate, and of the press; presi-
dents of utilities; attorneys; and trained technical persons
and especially through the county government and state legis-
lature--have exercised an almost compulsory power on the city
through the use of the eminent domain doctrine."1 8
While a sovereign takes private property for public use
it is sometimes questionable as to whether the public will
really profit from this action. The use of the eminent domain
doctrine has been an integral part of the movement toward pro-
gressive housing developments. Though the housing situation
has improved generally, its benefits are grossly distorted.
It appears that the sovereign has directed its efforts to the
treatment of the effect of housing problems rather than the
cause of them. Many of the housing problems are instances of
injustice; and it is inequality that must be transcended.
These same disunities mark the availability of land and its
use--the neighborhood, town, or city in which the public
17
19
lives. Piecemeal solutions disrupt each other. What
appears to be an advance here is merely a regression there.
So, one cannot infer progress from the multiplication of
agencies of planning, or from the gradually increasing scope
that may be permitted to each of them. Despite the use of the
eminent domain doctrine or because of its use our communities
are environments of dislocation and decay, alternating locali-
ties of affluence and disintegration, in which housing defi-
ciences are made more loathsome by surfeit of "power to take"
and housing developments rendered functionless by the absence
of reasonable or purposeful objective. Within this general
formlessness, individual institutions carry sophisticated and
comprehensive programs of planning in which they turn the
public chaos to their private advantage. However, the social
whole is left to "automatic" devices in the belief that un-
directed individual activity under the impetus of its riwn
competitive self-interest will automatically satisfy _cmnunity
needs. Such institutionalized fragmentation is anathera to a
community.20
This is another point of fundamental antagonism becween
communal demands and individual rights. The wresting of power
from private hands proceeds in an uneven and uncooriinoTed
progress whose gains are often more illusory than real. As we
have already seen, the areas progressively won for public use
are isolated from each other, and still under the pressures of
that remaining autonomous power which aims to bend the public
realm to its own device.
Though there is no cure-all for the problems springing out
of the eminent domain doctrine, cooperative efforts can go a
long way toward mitigating the effects of procedural awkward-
ness. What starts out piecemeal may develop into some appro-
ximation of genuine use of the powers afforded by the eminent
domain doctrine.
The location of low-cost housing is a most coiplex problem
because the interests of the occupants of the housing must be
considered along with that of the residents of the area sur-
rounding the site. The problem should be resolved to the best
interest of the entire community after listening to all who
wish to be heard, and careful study. The upkeep of low-cost
housing can be reduced by good planning, whic) will at the
same time lessen the need to "take more prope-ty" under the
power of eminent domain. New low-cost housing should be
built on the available land before clearing the present slum
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areas, but everything possible should be done to prevent the
building of the slums of tomorrow under the guise of low-cost
housing today.
Conclusion
We have seen the great demand of land for housing create
unusual difficulties, mainly because the sovereign has seen
fit to use its eminent domain power in an effort to ameliorate
the housing deficiencies. This problem is increasingly be-
coming the concern of various communities, and especially
those parties directly involved. These parties can be nar-
rowed down to: (1) the sovereign--the party who takes private
property for public use; (2) the private property owner--the
party whose land is taken for public use; and (3) the public--
the party for whom the property is taken. As one examines the
relationship of these parties it can be noted that the im-
balance of supply and demand (property for housing) has a
direct causal connection between the imbalance of the sover-
eign's power and the individual property owner's rights.
Understandably, the parties concerned have relied upon
the law as a means to resolve this imbalance. The basic or
fundamental law is the United States Constitution, which was
designed to offer equal protection to all parties. Thus the
present state of the law has not on its face provided for
reconciliation of the imbalance. Up to now the American
society has tolerated this situation, after being convinced by
politicians, city planners, and lawyers that community prog-
ress should not be sacrificed for individual rights. In a
sense, community progress has been attained and this progress
has enhanced progressive developments in its population. Now
that we have a more sophisticated society, it is able to
assess the real value of continued taking of private property
for public use. Much of the population is resisting this con-
tinued taking, and there have been many presentations of
reasons for the same by representatives of the opposers who
make consistent reference to negative illustrations of (1) how
the eminent domain doctrine has been used; (2) those who have
benefited; and (3) those who have been deprived by this
process. It is believed that the use of the eminent domain
doctrine initiates a vicious cycle which ultimately results
in the very kind of situation that it is supposedly designed
to eliminate.
As we look around us, it is obvious that the doctrine has
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been effective in creating housing, but at the same time is
gnawing away at our democracy. The democratic philosophy of
our country will have little meaning if this imbalance between
our government and its people persists. Thus, the eminent
domain doctrine should not be used unless there is a greater
participation of all mutually dependent elements of a given
population. This kind of participation is needed if we hope
to gain a more effective resolution of the housing problems
through the exercise of the eminent domain doctrine.
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THE TWO FACES OF PALSGRAF
Vincent P. Maltese
This research paper seeks to bring together the views ex-
pounded by various authorities on the famous Tort law case,
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.1 Before the PaIsgraf decision,
writers and judges had relied almost unanimously on the hold-
ing2of the leading English case, Smith v. London and S. W.
Ry, in defining liability for negligence. Then came the
Palsgraf decision. The facts of the PaIsgraf case are rela-
tively simple to understand. The reader is confronted basi-
cally with a situation such as this: A, who is negligent in
relation to B, by the same act injures C in an unforeseeable
manner. The facts are simple yet PaIsgraf is cited in almost
all negligence cases. Why? Let us take a look.
A railway guard in assisting a passenger running to catch
a departing train, knocked a package from the passenger's arm.
An explosion followed, the package having contained fireworks.
The railway guard was ignorant of this fact. The concussion
knocked over some scales standing a considerable distance
away, and in falling they injured the plaintiff, Mrs. Palsgraf.
Mrs. Paisgraf brought an action against the railway company
for the negligence of its servant.
The trial court held for Mrs. Paisgraf. The Appellate
Division affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court of
Appeals of New York, however, reversed the decision by a 4-3
margin in favor of the railroad company.
Mr. Justice Cardozo spoke for the majority of the court.
Cardozo and the majority of the court concluded that defend-
ant's conduct was not a wrong in relation to Mrs. PaIsgraf.
Cardozo said, "The risk reasonably to be prevented defines
the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk
to another or others within the range of apprehension." 3
It is safe to assume the majority of the court was dealing
with the problem as one of duty. According to the majority
the defendant owed a duty to the boarding passenger and to
others who might have been prejudiced by such conduct as a
result of the incidents against which such duty gives pro-
tection, but owed no duty to the plaintiff, Mrs. PaIsgraf,
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against the hazard which transpired.
The majority of the court believed that negligence "is a
relation between particular persons, those within the risk of
harm from the negligent act. It is not a wrong to third per-
sons outside the sphere of foreseeable risks, therefore, they
cannot recover even though they may have been injured by the
negligent act. The defendant's conduct was not a wrong
towards the plaintiff merely because it was a wrong towards
the boarding passenger." The majority thought the question
of duty should be determined by the court, not by the jury.
The minority of the court, speaking through Justice
Andrews, assumed a duty and insisted that the plaintiff was
entitled to rely upon its violation. The dissent further in-
sisted that coupled with the question of duty was the question
of proximate cause and that both questions should be decided
by the jury.
Andrews thought there had to be a line drawn as to whether
or not Mrs. Palsgraf could recover for her injuries. He
thought the jury ought to perform that function, or at least
"that the court could not say as a ma ter of law that it could
not be so drawn to allow a recovery."
Andrews, stating the minority contention, said: "Due
care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect societ
from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B, or C alone."
Under Andrews' approach, the defendant is liable for those
subsequent events of which the impact is the proximate and
natural or direct cause.
Viewing the facts of the Palsgraf case and those of the
Smith case, it is hard for me to reconcile the two decisions.
The Smith case has been cited with approval by Beven, Street,
Bohlen, Jeremiah Smith, and many other writers on the question
of liability for the unforeseeable consequences of a negligent
act. Let us try to compare and contrast the two cases if we
can.
During an exceptionally hot summer the defendant's workmen
trimmed a hedge bordering the railway line and allowed the
trimmings to remain in heaps. A fire, probably ignited by a
spark from an engine, broke out in the heaps, spread across a
stubble field and over a road, and was carried 200 yards by a
high wind to the plaintiff's cottage which was completely
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destroyed. The trial court held for the plaintiff and that
decision was affirmed by the High Court.
The majority of the court held that there was "sufficient
evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant in rela-
tion to the plaintiff."7 In essence, the majority said that
the defendant should have foreseen possible harm to the plain-
tiff. Justice Brett, speaking for the dissenters, said that
the defendant was not negligent to this particular plaintiff,
although the act of leaving the inflammable heaps might have
been negligent in relation to others. The plaintiff was not
foreseeable. How many reasonable men would contend that a
fire, started from sparks from a passing train, would ignite
a heap of trimmings, spread across a stubbled field, cross
over a road, be carried some 200 yards by a sudden high wind,
and burn a person's cottage?
In both cases there were negligent acts: in PaIsgraf, the
railway guard negligently grabbing the passenger's arm, knock-
ing the package to the ground; In Smith, the railway company
allowing trimmings which were dried out and inflammable to re-
main along the tracks where trains passed daily emitting hot
sparks. In both cases the plaintiffs were injured as a con-
sequence of the negligent act. In both cases the defendants
could not reasonably foresee any injury to the plaintiffs, but
were negligent as to others.
Why different decisions? Why in the Smith case, was the
defendant liable to the plaintiff, even though, owing to the
distance of the plaintiff's cottage, no reasonable man would
have foreseen that the plaintiff's cottage might be destroyed?
Why was the defendant in the Paisgraf case held not liable for
negligently knocking the package out of the passenger's arm
and causing the explosion which injured the plaintiff situated
some distance from where the act took place?
To the writer's knowledge there is only one logical reason
why the New York court and Cardozo departed from the Smith
holding. The New York tribunal concerned itself with the
question, "WHERE DOES LIABILITY STOP?" Liability in the Smith
case was found on the basis of direct causation. Direct
causation may go too far. It draws no satisfactory and clear
line. Sometimes direct causation can lead to fantastic and
unbelievable occurrences too remote to be reasonably imagined.
A train could emit sparks resulting in a fire that
24
destroys a person's home, and the fire, carried by sudden high
winds, could successively destroy neighbor's homes8 and pos-
sibly a whole town. The defendant's negligent act, if estab-
lished to be such, is certainly the direct cause of the town's
destruction. The results, however, seem too fantastic an
occurrence to hold one defendant liable for the losses sus-
tained by all the inhabitants of the town.
The first problem in Paisgraf one must face is the signi-
ficance of "duty." It means "an obligation to which the law
will give recognition and efect, to conform to some standard
of conduct toward another." Al I courts agree that a duty
must arise out of some "relation" between the parties, but
what that relation is no one has ever succeeded in defining.
It is up to the court to say if there was a duty owed to the
plaintiff by the defendant. Mrs. Palsgraf bought a ticket for
the defendant's train. She was waiting on defendant's property
to catch it. The court could have easily found that the de-
fendant owed Mrs. PaIsgraf a duty by simply saying so.
The term duty in a legal formula performs a function
similar to the letter X in an algebraic formula-what does X
equal? The term negligence or violation of duty performs the
same function of the letter Y--what does Y equal? One is for
the judge, the other for the jury. Both are unknown quanti-
ties.
The court's function indicated by the inquiry
as to duty, is in its final analysis, the question
whether the case demands the concurring judgment of
a jury in its determination. If it does not, the
court simply says there is no duty, as the majority
said in Palsgraf. If the court, however, is not so
satisfied with its own concludion then it will sub-
mit the case to the jury as in Smith, if the evi-
dential data warrant so doing. This marks the dif-
ference between Cardozo and Andrews in the Palsgraf
10case.
A second problem is that of "foreseeability." "Duty does
not always coincide with the foreseeable risk. 1 1 Was the
damage reasonably to be foreseen by a reasonable man in de-
fendant's position? The plaintiff has been hurt and someone
must bear the loss. Essentially the choice is between the
innocent plaintiff and a defendant who is admittedly at fault.
"If the loss is out of all proportion to the defendant's
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fault, it can be no less out of proportion to the plaintiff's
innocence. If it is unjust to the defendant to make him bear
the loss which he could not have foreseen, it is no less un-
just to the plaintiff to make her bear a loss she too could
not have foreseen, and which is not even due to her own negli-
gence. In these cases there is no justice to be had." 12 The
problem of foreseeability is not a new one. Courts have
already considered it in terms of duty as well as proximate
cause.
The question to which Cardozo and Andrews devoted most of
their argument was whether negligence can be transferred--
that is, whether negligence toward the man running for the
train can be transferred to Mrs. Palsgraf so as to give her a
cause of action against the wrongdoer. Cardozo said no. He
said, "The plaintiff must sue in her own right for a wrong per-
sonal to her, and not as a vicarious beneficiary of a breach
of duty to another."1 3 Andrews said Mrs. Palsgraf could rely
on defendant's violation of a duty to the boarding passenger
and that the question is one for the jury to decide.
A fourth problem involves the question, "where does lia-
bility stop?" Andrews uses direct causation. The guard
knocked loose the package, its fall caused the explosion,
the explosion knocked over the scales, the scales hit the
plaintiff. Nothing intervened. It is not, however, an entirely
satisfactory test. It draws no clear line and it can go too
far. Cardozo simply says, if the plaintiff is not within the
circle of the foreseeable risk, she cannot recover.
A fifth problem and an important one is social policy:
Whether the defendant in such cases should bear
the heavy negligence losses of a complex civiliza-
tion, rather than the individual plaintiff. Be-
cause these defendants are in a large measure public
utilities, governmental bodies, industries, auto-
mobile drivers, and others, who by rates, prices,
taxes or insurance, are better able to distribute
the loss to the general public, many courts may
reasonably consider that the burden should rest
upon them, and experience no great difficulty in
finding a 'duty' of protection. 14
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Conclusion
The PaIsgraf case forsakes "proximate cause" and states
the issue of foreseeability in terms of "duty."
The Palsgraf case has become hopelessly entangled with
other rules, and other legal policies. The case has been
cited in cases in which a statute is intended to protect only
a particular class of persons Ir to guard against only a par-
ticular risk or type of harm. It has been cited in holding
that a railroad's duty towards drivers at crossings does not
extend to its employees. 16 Paisgraf has been relied on in
holding that a contract obligation does not extend to third
parties. 17 It has been relied on in holding that a plaintiff,
who is himself in a position of safety, cannot recover for
mental shock and injury brought about by the sight of harm or
peril to another person within the danger zone. 18 The holding
that duty in a negligence action extends only to those within
a definite area of danger has obvious merits. It simplifies
the problem and facilitates administration by restricting the
defendant's responsibility within some reasonable bounds. It
is also more consistent with the basic theory of negligence,
that of creation of an unreasonable risk.
There are perhaps three factors which should be considered
in determining whether Cardozo's or Andrews' approach is to
be preferred. First, which view is more consistent with our
sense of justice in the particular case? This is a difficult
question to answer. Courts rarely discuss it. Second, which
view is more consistent with the underlying theory of negli-
gence? The defendant's act was wrongful only because it
created a risk--an unreasonable risk of harm to the package.
"Seldom have the courts, except as to consequences immediately
following the tortious impact, extended liability beyond the
field in which there is an appreciable risk of harm." 19
Cardozo rationalizes the results making them consistent with
the fundamental concept of negligence. Andrews' approach is
contra to the great weight of American decisions. Third,
which of the two approaches can be more easily applied? It
would be difficult to apply Andrews' directness test. "Those
using this test are merely playing with a metaphor; if direct-
ness connotes the comparative absence of external forces not
set in motion by the defendant, it is not responsive to the
decisions, either as a test of inclusion or exclusion." 20
Cardozo's "risk concept" has a meaning as adopted by the
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Restatement.
In order for the actor to be negligent with
respect to the other, his conduct must create a
recognizable risk of harm to the other individu-
ally, or to a class of persons--for example, all
persons within a given area of danger--of which
the other is a member. If the actor's conduct
creates such a recognizable risk of harm only to
a particular class of persons, the fact that it
causes harm to a person of a different class, to
whom the actor could not reasonably have anti-
cipated injury, does not make the actor liable to
the persons so injured.2 1
Prosser feels that in a case like Paisgraf, in which
judges disagree, then the case should go to the jury. "Surely
if reasonable men disagree a jury should decide the question
of fact."2 2
Paisgraf v. Long Island R. R. will be cited many times
more. It will even be more so the subject of discussions and
debates. Some will follow the FACE which Cardozo displays,
others will follow the shadow of Andrews' FACE. One thing is
for sure, as Mr. Prosser states, "Palsgraf did one thing for
certain. It submitted to the nation's then most excellent
state court a law professor's dream of an examination ques-
tion."2 3
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SANE OR INSANE PROVISIONS IN INSURANCE POLICIES
J. Tyrone Duncan
Generally, the majority of courts have upheld provisions
of a life or accident insurance policy excluding liability for
injury or death resulting from the insured's suicide. Some
earlier cases held that self-destruction while insane was not
suicide within a provision against death by suicide, since
there could be no suicide unless the person committing the act
of self-destruction could form a conscious intention to kill
himself and carry out that act, knowing its moral and physical
conditions and consequences. In response to such holdings,
insurance companies began to add the words, "sane or insane"
to the ordinary exclusion provisions.
Apparently, the difficulty arises from the use of the
term "suicide." On one hand, if one construes suicide to mean
a volitional act with complete knowledge of the consequences
that might result, one could plausibly argue that the inser-
tion of the words "sane or insane" contributes nothing, since
the same results would be reached without the addition of such
words. On the other hand, if one considers suicide to mean
only that act which caused death which was physically performed
by the insured, then a different conclusion will follow.
Different courts using different approaches in deciding
cases dealing with the exclusionary clause have reach dif-
ferent results. Some courts have held that when a policy of
insurance excludes liability for death resulting from suicide,
sane or insane, or uses similar language, it is not necessary
that the insured should have been able to realize the moral
nature and quality of the self-destructive act from which
death resulted. According to this approach, recovery should
be denied when death resulted from intentional self-destruction
even though the insured may have been so insane as not to be
able to appreciate the nature of his act. See Bigelow v.
Virkshire Insurance Co., 93 U.S. 284 (1876); Union Life In-
surance Co. v. Hollowell, 14 Ind. App. 611 (1896); Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. McLaughlin, 380 S.W. 2d 101 (1965).
In the Hollowell case, supra, the court held erroneous
an instruction by the trial court judge to the effect that a
provision that self-destruction, whether sane or insane,
avoided the policy, did not apply inless the poison was
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deliberately and willfully taken by the insured with the in-
tent to commit suicide. In rejecting this instruction by the
trial court judge, the appellate court stated all the insurer
was required to prove was that the poison was taken with the
intent to commit suicide. The court added that the conscious
and voluntary act by the insured in taking the poison with the
intent to take his own life was sufficient to defeat a claim
for recovery, whether the act committed was deliberate or not.
In the McLaughlin case, supra. an action was brought by
the insured's widow under an accident policy which contained
a clause excluding liability for any loss cause by "suicide,
sane or insane." The trial court's definition of suicide was
such that required the deceased to have understood the nature
and probable consequences of his act. The Supreme Court of
Texas reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded the case
to the trial court. The court held, inter alia, that in order
for an act to be suicide, sane or insane, it was not necessary
for the deceased to have realized the physical nature and con-
sequences of his act, nor for the deceased to have had a con-
scious purpose to take his own life. The test used by the
court was whether the act was one which would have been
regarded as suicide in the mind of a sane person. Such a test
appears to be more favorable to the insurer than to the in-
sured.
A second approach utilized by some courts involves those
cases in which no mention is made as to the degree of compre-
hension which the insured must have in order that his self-
destructive act be suicide, sane or insane. In these situa-
tions the courts have held that suicide or self-destruction
by an insured falls within the exclusion provision of the
policy that bars recovery. See Equitable Life Insurance Co. v.
Herbert, 37 Ind. App. 373 (1906); Attorney General v. Colonial
Life Insurance Co., 80 N.E. 455 (1907); Weber v. Guardian Life
Insurance Co., 2 Tenn. App. 624 (1926); Lincoln Petroleum Co.
v. New Life Insurance Co., 115 F. 2d 73 (1940).
In the Lincoln case, supra the claimant brought an
action on life insurance policy excepting coverage for death
through self-destruction, whether insured was sane or insane.
Evidence tended to show that on the night of the insured's
death he had been drinking heavily and was intoxicated. The
court held that the provision excluding claimant recovery
barred recovery on the ground that death was due to self-
destruction, regardless of whether the mental faculties of the
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insured were affected at the time by alcoholic drink.
A third approach used by some courts involvesthose cases s
in which death was the result of an accident. These courts
held that when death was the result of an accident, which re-
sulted from the insured's own act, such was not within the
scope of the policy provision excluding or limiting liability
when the death resulted from suicide, sane or insane. See
Edwards v. Travelers' Life Insurance Co., 122 U.S. 457 (1884);
Spruill v. Northwestern Insurance Co., 120 N.C. 141 (1897);
Thaxton v. N. Y. Life Insurance Co., 143 N.C. 33 (1906);
Parker v. New York Life Insurance Co., 188 N.C. 403 (1924).
In the Edwards case, supra, a provision that the policy
shall be void if the insured "shall die by suicide, whether
the act be voluntary" was held not to apply when the insured,
a sane person, killed himself by accident. In the Spruill
case, supra the court held that death by accident or mistake
does not automatically thrust the case within the exclusion
clause of the policy, "since there must be at least physically
some suicidal intent." In the Thaxton case, supra- a provi-
sion excluding liability if the insured "die by his own hands
or action, whether sane or insane, does not include a killing
by accident, even though the act of the insured could have
been the unintended means of causing death." It was held in
the Parker case, supra, that the exclusion of self-destruction,
whether the insured be sane or insane, did not exclude
liability for death by accident, even though by the insured's
own act.
A fourth approach used by some courts is commonly known
as the Kentucky rule. Courts adhering to this approach have
held that if the insured was in such a mental state that he
was not able to appreciate the physical nature and conse-
quences of his act, which resulted in his death, the death did
not fall within the exclusionary provision. See Christensen
v. New England Mutual, 197 Ga. 807 (1944); Bullard v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co., 127 S.E. 75 (1924); Wharton v. New
Life Insurance Co., 178 N.C. 133 (1921).
The court in the Christensen case, supra, found that a
life insurance policy provided for a limitation of liability
if the insured died by his own hand, sane or insane. The in-
sured died by jumping from a sixth-story window to escape from
imaginary enemies; the insured did not realize that his act of
self-destruction would cause his death. The court held that
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the insured must have intended to take his own life in order
that his beneficiary be excluded from recovery. In the Bullard
case, supra the court held that the jury had been properly
instructed that the burden of proof was on the insurer to show
that death was not the result of natural or accidental causes.
The insurer must show that the insured died by his own hand
from taking a drug with the intention of destroying himself.
In the Wharton case, supra- the court said that there is a pre-
sumption of law against the insured having committed suicide,
so that the burden of proof is on the party asserting suicide.
A fifth approach taken by many courts is that in order for
the insurer to avoid liability under an exclusion provision,
it need not be shown that the insured had the mental capacity
to realize the consequences of his act or to form a conscious
purpose to kill himself. See De Gogorza v. Knickbocker Life
Insurance Co., 65 N.Y. 232 (1875); Riley v. Hartford Life In-
surance Co., 25 F. 315 (1885); Gavin v. Des Moines Life In-
surance Co., 126 N.W. 906 (1910); Parker v. Aetna Life In-
surance Co., 232 S.W. 708 (1921); Spruill v. N. W. Life In-
surance Co., 120 N.C. 141 (1897).
In the De Gogorza case, supra. the court held that the
provision "die by his own hand or acts, sane or insane,"
applied even though the insured was mad or insane. Thus the
mere act of self-destruction, although involuntary, was a bar
to recovery under the exclusion provision of the life insurance
policy. In the Riley case, supra the court held that the
phrase, "felonious or otherwise," in the provision of policy is
equivalent to the words "sane or insane." Therefore, the
court ruled out all testimony as to the condition of the mind
of the insured when he committed his fatal act. The assumption
was apparently that the insured intended to take his own life.
In the Gavin case, supra a provision made the policy void if
the insured "die by his own hand or act whether sane or insane!'
The court observed:
The cases generally make a distinction between
suicide and self-destruction when insane suicide
includes the moral element of intentional self-
destruction, while an insane man may commit the
act without the presence of such moral element.
In the Parker case, supra, the court held that in order
to be suicide at all, death must have been intentionally and
not accidently, inflicted upon himself by the deceased. In
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the Spruill case, cited earlier, the North Carolina Supreme
Court said:
As the expressions "committed suicide and died
by his own hands" were held synonymous, the words
added thereto, "sane or insane" are regarded as
equally synonymous and intended to protect the in-
surer from all liability where suicide whether
sane or insane, regardless of the degree of in-
sanity. . . .
The sixth and final approach suggests that recovery will
be denied under an exclusion of "suicide, sane or insane" or
other equivalent language, if the only showing is that the
self-destructive act resulted from an irresistible impulse by
the insured. See Columbian National Life Insurance Co. v.
Wood, 236 S.W. 526 (1922); Brower v. Supreme Lodge Nat'l Re-
serve, 74 Mo. App. 490 (1898); Adkins v. Columbian Life In-
surance Co., 70 Mo. 27 (1879).
In the Wood case, supra. the court drew a distinction
between lack of intention on the part of the insured to kill
himself and an irresistible impulse to do so. The court
recognized that it was impossible to realize such an intention;
therefore, the suicide clause with the words "sane or insane"
would not apply. The court added that an irresistible impulse
of an insured to kill himself, which he cannot control, does
not prevent the application of such provision excluding lia-
bility.
In the Brower case, supra. the court disapproved of an
instruction which placed on the insurer the burden of showing
that the death was a result of the insured's own voluntary act
done for the purpose of taking his own life.
Summary
As indicated earlier, courts using different approaches
in dealing with the exclusionary clause have reached dif-
ferent, and sometimes shocking, results. Six different views
are listed below.
According to the first approach, recovery should be
denied when death resulted from intentional self-destruction,
even though the insured was so insane that he was unaware of
the nature and physical quality of his act.
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According to a second view, the degree of comprehension
of the insured at the time of his death has been held to be
immaterial. This approach, along with the first approach,
appears to be unduly harsh, since the state of mind of the in-
sured at the time of his death has no bearing on the outcome
of the case. Apparently, proponents of this school of thought
subscribe to a strict construction of the exclusion provision
of the policy. In other words, if an insane person takes his
own life, his beneficiary or claimant cannot recover on the
policy because of the exclusion provision barring recovery.
According to the third approach, if a person, sane or in-
sane, destroys himself by accident, the exclusion clause of
the policy does not apply; therefore, the beneficiary of the
insured may recover in the amount of the terms of the policy.
According to the fourth approach, known as the Kentucky
rule, courts have held that if the insured was in such a
mental state that he was not able to appreciate the physical
nature and consequences of his self-destructive act, death
does not fall within the exclusionary clause. Thus, the
claimant may recover for the insured's death. The third and
fourth approaches appear to be sound and fair to all parties
concerned, since there is a presumption in law that a man will
not take his own life.
According to the fifth approach, the courts have held
that it was not necessary to show that the insured lacked the
mental capacity to realize the consequences of his act or even
for a conscious purpose to kill himself.
According to the sixth and final approach, if the insured
at the time of his death suffered from an irresistible impulse
to take his own life, his claimant cannot recover because of
the exclusion provision in the insurance policy. The author,
for the same reasons advanced under the second approach, dis-
agrees with the fifth and sixth approaches used by the courts.
However, it should be noted that each case should be deter-
mined according to the particular facts of the case.
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DURHAM* IS DEAD--THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM TEST OF
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS
Zollie Richburg
"Or have we eaten on the insane root
that takes the reason prisoner?"
--Macbeth: Act I, Scene III
Man's search for a test of criminal responsibility is
almost epochless. Once he found a workable test, he was re-
luctant to relinquish it. Maybe his reason was that it was
wiser to bear the ill he had, no matter how zany the ill was,
than fly to another he knew not of.
The purposes of this article are: (1) to present a his-
tory of the insanity defense in the federal courts, including
the Supreme Court; (2) to give a brief history of the insanity
defense used in the English courts; and (3) to list the present
tests used in the different circuits.
Few would question the statement that Durham was welcomed
in the criminal field as far as criminal responsibility was
concerned. But it is dead, and its elegy was either joyful or
sad, depending upon the circuit.
Durham's epitaph cannot be written yet, because it is
only dead in the Federal Courts of Appeals, not in some state
courts.
Durham enabled the lawyer to do more than he had been
doing previously. But due to certain legal technicalities and
canons, he is still hindered in his work.
"The lawyer is bound by all fair and honorable means, to
present every defense that the law of the land permits, to the
end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by
due process of law."' Not infrequently, an attorney who
*Durham v. United States, 94 U.S. App. D. C. 228, 214 F.
2d 862 (1954).
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defends a person accused of crime may be faced with the diffi-
cult task of preventing the prosecution and the court from
learning that his client has a valid defense. For example, the
Code of the District of Columbia2 provides that any person who
has been acquitted of crime by reason of insanity shall be con-
fined to a hospital for the mentally ill.
This places the attorney and the client in an unusual pre-
dicament. If the client pleads "not guilty by reason of in-
sanity" and is acquitted, he may spend the rest of his life in
a hospital for the mentally ill. There is no law telling how
many years a person has to stay in such a hospital. In most
cases, the prosecution will accept a guilty plea of a lesser
crime to avoid the "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict.
The attorney can and in most cases thinks he should avoid the
insanity defense. But he ethically cannot present another
defense if a defendant admits his guilt.
The attorney presents the only ethical defense he knows--
the insanity defense. Whether this defense will avail the
attorney or defendant anything depends upon the circuit he is
in.
Contrary to what many people believe, insanity as a de-
fense had its genesis in the fourteenth century.3 The
M'Naghten rule,4 or the right and wrong test, was born four
centuries later. Between M'Naghten and the first test lies
the "Child of fourteen years I est." 5 The "Child Test," which
seems to be much more liberal than M'Naghten, was formulated
in the seventeenth century.7 Briefl stated, the test is what
would a child of fourteen have done.
The M'Naghten rule, which is presently the test used in
the majority of American jurisdictions,9 is not a novel test.
In part, M'Naghten was built on the "good and evil" founda-
tion.10 The M'Naghten rule, which a receni1 Royal Commission
(1949-1953) of its birthq2ace repudiated, would soon creep
into the federal courts.
Another test used in England was the "wild beast test." 1 3
In order for an accused to be exempt from responsibility, he
"must be a man that is totally deprived of his reason and
memory, and doth not know what he is do 4g, no more than an
infant, than a brute, or a wild beast." This test has been
completely and totally abandoned.
37
It seems as though England had so many tests for insanity,
even she was probably confused as to which to apply.
In considering M'Naghten and the reason behind her, "Her"
is used deliberately to indicate that M'Naghten was the True
Eve of all insanity defenses. Necessity, being the mother of
all rules, doctrines, and inventions, created M'Naghten. It
was not necessary for society to have her. But society could
not stand to see a defendant go free when he assassinated a
famous personality. In other words, its creation was due to
the assassination or attempted assassination of famous per-
sonalities. And the nemesis it tried to create did more harm
than good. These facts will verify the supposition that had
there been no assassination or attempted assassination of
famous personalities, there would have been no M'Naghten.
The M'Naghten rule, as it has become known in the criminal
field, should be called the Oxford rule. 15 Oxford unsuccess-
fully tried to assassinate the Queen. The House of Lords re-
pudiated all of the previous insanity tests and created the
right-wrong test,1 6 which was adopted three years later in
M'Naghten without an iota of change. 17 M'Naghten was no more
nor less a reiteration of Oxford.
M'Naghten believing one Drummond, secretary to Sir Robert
Peel then Prime Minister of England, was Sir Robert, shot and
killed Drummond as he rode in the carriage which normally
would have been occupied by Sir Robert. But for the fact that
Sir Robert chose to ride in Queen Victoria's carriage because
of her absence from London, M'Naghten's plan to assassinate
the Prime Minister was unsuccessful.18 The ending need not be
told.
As far as American federal courts are concerned, M'Naghten
was never used until 1882.19 Guiteau pleaded not guilty by
reason of insanity for the assassination of President Garfield.
The Court for the first time adopted M'Naghten and rejected
the moral turpitude test established in 1818.20
Probably the first federal case decided in the United
States dealing with insanity as a defense was United States v.
Clark.2 1 The Court here charged the jury that if a person
"was in such a state of mental insanity, not produced by the
immediate effects of intoxicating drink, or not to have been
conscious of the moral turpitude of the act they should find
him not guilty." The words "right" and "wrong" were not
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used anywhere in the case and the test seemed to have been
moral turpitude. This test, however, was not mentioned in any
other reported case.
The next case, United States v. Holmes,2 3 which is a
favorite among criminal law students, occurred in 1858. Since
the insanity defense had been promulgated in the federal
courts, this was the first reported case in which the word
"wrong" was used. But here Holmes' sanity was really not at
issue. The question, which was strictly a legal and moral one,
was whether a man would be justified in killing a small number
of people to save a larger number. The ending will be pre-
termitted; it has been told many times. In essence, the in-
sanity defense, though raised, was dictum.
One year later in United States v. Sickles,2 4 the court
spoke of the right-wrong test. However, M'Naghten was not
given approval and neither was it cited. The federal courts,
as far as the insanity defense was concerned, worked like a
pendulum. They used any test swinging in their direction.
American courts we not lacking in English precedents
for a test of insanity. Because of convenience, easiness,
and self-explanation to the jury, M'Naghten was probably
selected; also, the assassination or attempted assassination
of famous personalities.2 6
In 1882,27 M'Naghten was wedged into the federal courts
and there it was given imprimatur. "Whether the inability to
resist wrong by one having an actual knowledge of the dif-
ference between right and wrong, is such a mental disorder as
would constitute a defense to the crime of murder, query." 2 8
The right-wrong test was reaffirmed in United States v.
Lee.2 9 The Court said that "the barbarous manner in which a
homicide was committed does not of itself furnish any basis
for the defense of insanity."
3 0
The right-wrong test remained in the District of Columbia
until 1929,3 1 when the Court approved the irresistible impulse
test. This test, although it was dictum at the time it was
enunciated, is traceable to 1840, three years prior to
M'Naghten, and can be found in Regina v. Oxford.3 2
Here it was stated that if a person "was laboring under
some controlling disease, which was in truth the acting power
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within him which he could not resist, then he will not be re-
sponsible."
The irresistible impulse test was not long lasting. In
1954, it too was given a decent burial in Durham v. United
States.34
In 1951, the some evidence rule was created in Tatum v.
United States. 3 5 Briefly stated the rule is that once the
defendant has put forth "some evidence" of insanity, the judge
must instruct the jury on this issue. In Tatum, the defendant
did not plead not guilty by reason of insanity, but simply
said he "remembered nothing of what happened at the time the
offense was committed."3 6 The Court held that this consti-
tuted "some evidence."
A very unusual case dealing with the rule is Lehron v.
United States.3 7 The defendant and her companions shot five
Congressmen from the House gallery. They unequivocally re-
fused to assert the insanity defense at their trial. On
appeal, however, they contended that (1) the very act of
shooting up Congress, (2) abnormal calmness of three defend-
ants, (3) the hysterical behavior of the lady defendant, and
(4) the fact of belonging to a minority group constituted
"some evidence" of insanity. The Court, of course, did not
accept this theory.
In Clark v. United States, 3 8 the defendant said he was
"crazy" once and "insane" or "insanity" thrice. This was held
not to constitute "some evidence."
What constitutes "some evidence" is a question of law
The necessary quantum of evidence is doubtful. One writer
has suggested that it Lfome evidencel "lies in a factual no-
man's land, somewhere between 'reasonable doubt' and 'mere
scintilla.'" 4 1 One thing is certain, "some evidence" is not
as strong as a reasonable doubt. The federal courts refused
to accept the view adopted by some state courts 4 2 that the
accused has the burden of introducing enough evidence to
raise a reasonable doubt of his sanity.
The "some evidence" rule is not a test of sanity, but is
a test of evidence. It may be stated by way of a question.
Did the defendant put forth enough testimony, as would require
an instruction of sanity? This legal technicality can aid
defense counsel in many respects.
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This rule not only aids the defense counsel but it also
helps the prosecution. It does not matter who raises the
sanity issue, once it is raised, the court must instruct the
jury.43
It is doubtful whether any case stirred more comment and
controversy than Durham v. United States.44 The rule should
be called the Pike rule, because it was first enunciated in
State v. Pike,4 5 eighty-five years before Durham. Anyway,
what is in a name? Any name other than M'Naghten or irre-
sistible would sound much better. The Durham rule has been
rejected in many federal and state courts. 4 6
The rule as stated in Durham is "that an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or defect."4 7 "Disease is a condition which is
considered capable of either improving or deteriorating."
And "defect is a condition which is considered capable of
either improving or deteriorating and which may be either
congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect
of a physical or mental disease."4 8
The Durham rule has undergone a mutation, not a revolu-
tion, in some circuits. Even the circuit which created Durham
extended it in Whalen v. United States. 4 9 The Court said that
if a defendant "does not know what he is doing or cannot con-
trol his conduct or his acts are the product of a mental
disease or defect, he is morally blameless and not criminally
responsible."50
Due to dicta uttered by the Supreme Court, 5 1 ;e circuits
have taken contrary views on the insanity defense. Davis
(1), Davis (11), Hotema, and Matheson represent the (1) burden
of proof, (2) trial court's charge, (3) sufficiency of the
jury charge, and (4) requested instructions, respectively.
The Second Circuit completely disregarded Durham in
United States v. Freeman, 5 3 and accepted the test given by the
American Law Institute. 54 "A person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct or a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his
conduct to the requirement of law."5!
This test was adopted in Wion v. United States,56 with
the addition of the word "knowing" 5 7 to "appreciate."
41
Whether the addition of the word "know" will aid the defendant
may be a moot question, but "know" means to "apprehend imme-
diately with the mind or with the senses," and "appreciate"
means to "evaluate highly or approve warmly often with ex-
pressions." 5 8
Another post Durham test is that if "as a result of
mental disease or defect /The defendant7 lacked substantial
capacity to conform his conduct to requirements of law which
he is alleged to have violated," 5 9 then he is not criminally
responsible.
There are eleven Circuit Courts of Appeals.60 These
circuits have accepted a new test--or e6 ended Durham:
District of Columbia Circuit, extended; Second Circuit,
accepted new test; 62 Third Circuit, accepted new test; 6 3
and Tenth Circuit, accepted new test.64 These Circuits either
adhere to M'Naghten or the irresistible impulse test: Fourth
Circuit, M'Naghten; 6 5 Fifth Circuit, irresistible or
M'Naghten;66 Sixth Circuit, irresistible impulse test and
M'Naghten; 67 Seventh Circuit, M'Naghten;6 Eighth Circuit,
M'Naghten;69 and Ninth Circuit, M'Naghten.
7 0
Using the Erie doctrine, some Circuits feel they must
abide by the state law of insanity. This is undoubtedly the
reason that they have taken contrary views. This view, how-
ever, is unfounded, since the courts of the United States
"have inherent judicial power to rule on the law of insani-
ty. 7 2
A careful review of the different circuits reveals that
not one follows the Durham rule anymore. Durham, once con-
sidered king of the insanity defense, is dead in the federal
courts.
The post Durham cases, although oases in the desert of
law pertaining to criminal insanity, have added nothing to the
scales of justice. They have done no more than sweep the dust
farther under the rug of justice. "/F/he American Law insti-
tute test is essentially M'Naghten plus irresistible impulse
recast in modern terminology, changing the archaic terms."7 3
The post Durham tests are in essence a judicial play with
words.
The Supreme Court should never be required to answer all
questions presented to it. But when lower courts take
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contrary views on an issue the Supreme Court should answer
that question.
It is absurd, though it is often the case, to say that
defendants, suffering from the same mental diseases or
defects, will not be accorded the same treatment. A defend-
ant in the Second Circuit who did not "appreciate" the wrong-
fulness of his conduct will be found "not guilty by reason of
insanity." A defendant in the Fourth Circuit who did "appre-
ciate" the wrongfulness of his conduct is subject to be found
guilty.
Des 9 te inconsistent results among the Courts of
Appeals, the Supreme Court has consistently refrained from
granting certiorari to consider the issue of criminal respon-
sibility. 7 5 The question was squarely presented to the Court
in all cases. It has been suggested that the Supreme Court's
refusal to give a test is more than mere coincidence. The
Supreme Court wants the Circuits to develop alternative tests
before making a definitive ruling. 7 6
The Circuits are seeking a proper test of criminal re-
sponsibility Although these are dicta in several Supreme
Court cases,7 7 the reports are actually barren of any holding
on criminal responsibility.
One day the Supreme Court will answer the question and
state a test to be used. It would not be surprising if it
holds that to punish an insane person, who did not appre-
ciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, would amount to a
denial of "due process of law."
Conclusion
The three-fold purposes of the criminal law are rehabili-
tation, deterrence and retribution. To punish those who are
mentally incompetent serves no rehabilitative function. You
do not deter one mentally incompetent by punishing another.
Retribution from one who is mentally incompetent is a sadis-
tic form of revenge.
Durham is dead and the criminal law is in need of a test
for criminal responsibility. M'Naghten, "a formula quite
color-blind to any gradations between black and white," 7 8 is
not the answer. The appreciable test as stated in Freeman7 9
may be the answer but there is a question of understandability.
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The jury will have a difficult task trying to understand the
test. Psychiatrists cannot determine criminal responsibility,
because they would be taking over the job of the law.
With the Circuits taking contrary views, the Supreme
Court should act. It would almost be a dereliction of its
duty and a mockery of the inscription on its building, "Equal
Justice Under Law," for it not to act.
"If insanity is not to be a defense, let us say so
frankly and even brutally, but let us not mock ourselves with
a definition that palters with reality. Such a method is
neither good morals nor good science nor good law." 8 0
The criminal law is an expression of the moral sense of
the community. Is it morally right to punish a person who
does not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct? It is
time for the community to stop looking for revenge, which is
only indicative of the fact that it has "eaten on the insane
root that takes the reason prisoner." Let the quest for
justice become the guiding light to the realization of those
ideals embodied in the concept of law, which countless jurists
and lawyers through the ages have sought to effectuate.
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THE NEGRO AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
A STIUDY IN COMMITMENT
Maynard H. Jackson*
Law Day Speaker, May 1, 1967
LAW DAY - U. S. A. is a day when America pauses to
recognize and, hopefully, to assess its commitment as a nation
to the rule of law. At best, however, that recognition raises
serious questions, and the assessment finds our commitment
wanting. Thus, on Law Day - 1967, we must wonder aloud how we
can help our country realize the humane and wonderful potential
of its founding ethic when we face the fact that, even today,
due process is still long overdue. Moreover, we find our-
selves gripped with the disquieting realization that, as things
stand now, the world cannot hear what America says because of
what America does.
The late, eminent jurist and legal giant, Mr. Justice
Benjamin Cardozo, once wrote in an opinion, "Danger invites
rescue. . . . The cry of distress is the summons to relief."
Since 1619, when the bowels of slave ships spewed onto the
docks of Jamestown, Virginia, chained black humanity, there
has echoed in America a plaintive cry of distress. Many have
been summonsed to relief, but few have answered. Of those who
heeded the cry, the Negro lawyer was the most enduring, the
most committed. With special reference to the past thirty
years, it may well be said of the American Negro lawyer that
never have so few done so much for so many with so little, for
so long, and for such a small return.
The American Negro lawyer asked American courts serious
and probing questions which raised revolutionary concepts.
Not the least among these was the question of whether the "due
process" clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in-
cluded the Negro. He asked: Is it the Negro's due that he
help support a public school system that not only denies him
and his children effective participation, but keeps the
*Attorney, United States Department of Labor, Atlanta,
Georgia.
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schools to which he is relegated in an inferior, overcrowded
state? The courts said, "No."
He asked: Are not facilities separated because of race
inherently unequal? The courts answered, "Yes."
He asked: Is it Mallory's due that he be convicted of a
crime by the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure in
violation of constitutional protections? The courts said,
The Negro lawyer asked: Is it the Negro's due that he be
denied the exercise of that right which is the very essence of
democracy--the right to vote; that in heaping indignity upon
indignity, this denial be aggravated by the staccato blows,
insults and maltreatment of officers sworn to uphold the law?
The courts said that was not our due.
Even now, the American Negro lawyer continues to ask if
it is the Negro's due that he be shunted aside, locked into
the more undesirable and overcrowded areas of our cities, and
be required to pay a proportionately higher percentage of his
income for the rental and purchase of generally lower quality
property; that he be blocked by political and direct or in-
direct racial restrictions in his efforts to secure better
housing; and whether it is the Negro's due that, as an indigent
tenant in low-rent, public housing, he be summarily evicted on
blatant pretext without an attempt by his evictor even to pay
"lip service" to the most fundamental and rudimentary dictates
of the concept of due process.
The commitment of the Negro lawyer in America historically
has been, and continues to be, a commitment to effectuate the
true principles of democracy. Through the rule of law, these
ambassadors-without-portfolio have sought to win the struggle
for an improved human condition. Our commitment dates back at
least to 1844 when Macon B. Allen was admitted to the bar of
the State of Maine as the first American Negro lawyer. In
1852, a Boston lawyer, Robert Morris, became the first Negro
magistrate in America. In 1861, a Massachusetts lawyer,
Edwin Garrison Walker, became the first American Negro legis-
lator. In 1865, John S. Rock, lawyer, physician and dentist,
became the first Negro admitted to practice before the United
States Supreme Court. In 1872, Charlotte Ray, a graduate of
Howard University Law School, became the first American Negro
woman lawyer. In 1911, William H. Lewis of Boston was
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appointed by President William H. Taft as the first Negro
Assistant United States Attorney General. By 1963, Chicago's
Edith S. Sampson and Philadelphia's Juanita Kidd Stout had be-
come the first Negro women elected as judges. In 1949, William
H. Hastie, for ten years a judge on the U. S. D. C. for the
Virgin Islands, was appointed by President Truman as the first
Negro judge on a United States Circuit Court of Appeals. In
1965, the Honorable Thurgood Marshall was confirmed as the
first Negro Solicitor General of the United States.
The legacy of commitment of Charles Houston and Thurgood
Marshall lives on today in the sacrificial and selfless devo-
tion of young Negro lawyers like Howard Moore, Jr., in Atlanta
and Marion Wright in Mississippi, a young South Carolina woman
and graduate of Yale Law School whose legal assault upon the
laws and customs of the "closed society" has been, at times,
sensational. Their story has been the story of untold numbers
of Negro lawyers who, despite persistent adversity, have mani-
fested the will to live the examined life. And, the adversities
have been manifold.
In addition to personal deficiencies in some Negro
lawyers as a result of inferior educational opportunities and/
or deprived social circumstances, he has had to cope with
faults of his own people and faults of the dominant race. Con-
vinced of his own inferiority, the American Negro historically
has transferred his inferiority complex so that he sometimes
conceives of the Negro attorney almost as the Calhoun of "Amos
and Andy." To the Negro lawyer he has taken the crumbs of
litigation, while to our white counterpart he has tendered the
full loaf.
Standing full-blown at the head of the offenders has been,
and frequently continues to be, the Negro businessman. What
is his excuse for channeling away from the Negro lawyer, ex-
cept in insignificant proportion, fees, retainers, and busi-
ness opportunities which would permit the development of law
firms of power, meaning and influence? It cannot be claimed
validly that the Negro lawyer cannot do the job. There have
been, are, and will be Negro men and women in the legal pro-
fession whose competence, ability, devotion, and creative
enthusiasm lead them to vigorously represent and successfully
protect the interests of their clients. No longer can we
honestly ask the Negro lawyer to prosecute our unpopular
causes and fail and refuse to reward him commensurately even
while the smell of victory lingers sweetly.
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When considered in light of the impediments and shackles
born of a system of discrimination and systematic exclusion,
the gains of the Negro lawyer are nothing short of phenomenal.
He was often shunted aside into segregated law schools which,
if for no other reason than that condition alone, were in-
herently unequal. Rising above that, he then found, regard-
less of the law school he finished, that his internship in the
operating rooms of the law was thwarted by the closed doors of
law firms and clerkships, doors that were locked by bigotry
and chained with indifference. Entering private practice, he
found, with some notable exceptions, that professional asso-
ciations rejected him because he was black. Thus, all impor-
tant contacts, social and professional intercourse, specialized
and complete libraries and research aids, seminars and effec-
tive participation in endorsements for appointments to the
bench were denied him.
North Carolina is not one of those notable exceptions.
The North Carolina Bar Association, as distinguished from the
North Carolina State Bar, is revealing itself to be a para-
doxical anachronism. By its continued refusal to accept Negro
lawyers of North Carolina into its membership, it renders the
concept of "justice and equality for all" a mockery and a sham,
and, thereby, contradicts the rationale of its very existence.
I believe, however, that the North Carolina Bar Association
will follow the enlightened course and disregard race as a re-
quirement for membership. I hope so.
Though the unfounded attitudes of some Negroes and the
American bar have often posed impediments to our entry into
the mainstream of American legal life, nothing has been so
insidious in its design and so crippling in its effect as the
dual standard of justice to which the American Negro has been
subjected. Born of ignorance and fear, nurtured by hate,
existing primarily though certainly not exclusively in the
South, the shroud of injustice has hung heavy on the brows
of black citizens for almost 350 years. High on the casualty
list was the Negro lawyer. No matter how qualified he was,
irrespective of his legal skill, and regardless of the just-
ness of his client's cause, he frequently found that justice
and equity were on vacation. Nor all his piety nor wit could
lure them back to their rightful dwelling place.
One point of clarification: let it be crystal clear that,
but for the equal devotion to the rule of law of many of our
white brothers at the bar, our lot today would truly be an
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intolerable one. We have not improved in, and cannot exist in,
a vacuum. Our lot is inextricably interwoven with his, our
hope with his hope. There should not be uncompromising divi-
sion among the ranks of those who share the common belief that
if there is not justice for all, there is no justice at all.
It would not be untoward to ask at this point--why bother?
Let me still this small voice that tells me, "You've got to be
lawyer." I'm only 1.3 per cent of the American legal profes-
sion, so I won't be missed. Doctors and dentists average a
higher income. I'm sometimes subjected to obloquy and scorn.
My family life suffers, and there is no guarantee that I'll
hit it big anyway. Who needs it?
We do. And, it needs us. To prevent our lives and the
lives of all men of law from becoming "absurd" caricatures of
meandering meaninglessness, to avoid deluding ourselves into
believing that we have found a haven, we must, within the con-
text of Albert Camus,, commit ourselves to an obstinate, daily
revolt against every form of the "absurd" and especially
against every Individual expression of the man-made "absurd-
ities" of evil and injustice, no matter by what sophistry of
high principle men seek to justify them. The very essence of
this revolt, say Guthrie and Diller, is an urgent sense of
human brotherhood and an attitude of comprehension. "We've
got to stand for something lest we fall for anything."
To win the struggle for an improved human condition
through law is an obligation to ourselves and mankind. To
persevere and triumph are duties so sacred that we shall
find it necessary to make uncommon demands of ourselves. We
must commit ourselves to insure that every day is Law Day,
and that every Law Day is an experiment in truth.
By so doing, we can give the meaning of law an independ-
ent existence to which generations yet unborn can cling. We
can help it to take root deep within the hearts of all men
throughout the tomorrows of tomorrow. AND, if we do, then we,
as Negro members of the legal profession, will be able to
raise our collective voice and say, in the words of that
Broadway song:
Everyone tells me to know my place, but that
ain't the way to play.
Why am I daring to show my face? 'Cause I've
got something to say.
55
Move over sun and give me some sky; I've got me
some wings I'm eager to try.
I may be unknown, but wait till I've flown--
You're gonna hear from me.
Make me some room, you people up there
On top of the world; I'll meet you, I swear!
I'm staking my claim; remember my name--
You're gonna hear from me.
Fortune smiled on the road before me.
Now listen world, you can't ignore me.
I've got a song that longs to be played.
Raise up my flag! Begin my parade!
Then watch the world over start coming up clover;
That's how it's gonna be, you'll see--
'Cause you're gonna hear from me!
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PRACTICAL TRAINING IN LAW SCHOOL
Milton E. Johnson*
For many years now there have been constant and relent-
less pressures put on the law schools all over this country
by many members of the bench and bar to put more emphasis on
so-called "Practical Training." By practical training the
critics refer to basic skills sometimes called "know-how" used
by the practicing attorney in his everyday practice of law and
professional responsibility. These critics contend that a
definite gap in the preparation for the practice of law exists
between the law school and the actual practice by the recent
graduate. It is further contended by these critics that it is
the job of the law school to bridge this gap in the preparation
of the new lawyer by giving him some training in the basic
skills of the profession. In this way the law schools would
turn out graduates reasonably prepared to represent their
clients after admission to the bar, and not a group of grad-
uates unprepared for the practice of law as are now being
turned loose on an unsuspecting public.
There are some members of the bench and bar, and a great
number of educators, who take the position that the law schools
are not equipped to teach the law student how to practice law;
that the law schools are doing efficiently the job properly
assigned to them, which is to turn out a graduate well grounded
in the law. They also contend that one cannot be taught pro-
fessional responsibility and that practical skills can best be
learned in the practice. In other words, according to this
school of thought, the responsibility of providing for the
training of young lawyers in practical skills if necessary, is
the responsibility of the bar, and not the law school.
This article proposes to review the opposing positions
taken by different writers on the subject of practical train-
ing in law schools and to report the courses offered in the
curriculum of a few selected law schools on practical skills.
The writer does not pretend to have made an exhaustive study
of available materials on the subject, but merely what he
*Professor of Law, North Carolina College Law School.
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considered representative because of a limited amount of time
available. Any conclusion reached or suggestions made by the
writer will be based on the materials set forth in the main
body of the paper and personal experiences of the writer as a
young practitioner.
One of the severe critics of the law schools is Mr. Arch
Cantrall of the West Virginia Bar. 1 Mr. Cantrall has stated
that he feels that law students do not get sufficient training
in the practical skills of a general law practice while they
are in law school. Since he is of the opinion that the primary
function of the law school is to train lawyers, he contends
that certain basic skills of the practice should be taught in
the law school.
The basic skills of the practice of law that Mr. Cantrall
would have the law school teach are:
. to examine a title; write a deed; and
other customary instruments; close a real estate
deal; institute and prosecute suits, including the
statutory proceedings of his jurisdiction; defend
a criminal; prepare individual partnership and
fiduciary tax returns; work out an estate plan;
prepare and probate a will; administer an estate
with the federal and state returns, etc., and
form, operate, and dissolve an individual pro-
prietorship, a partnership, and a corporation,
including compliance at each of these stages with
all the requirements of federal, state, and local
laws, tax and otherwise, applying to a small
business. 2
In short, Mr. Cantrall says that knowledge of these basic
and minimum required skills is necessary for the beginning
practitioner, and it is the job of the law schools to furnish
this training, which they are not doing.
There is no doubt that it would be desirable for any
lawyer to be an expert in all of the fields of law practice
that Mr. Cantrall suggests, but it is questionable whether the
law school can do the job or should even attempt to do it.
However, Mr. Cantrall is not alone in his belief that a cur-
riculum consisting exclusively of theory is insufficient for
the proper training of the law student. He cites the position
taken by the late Arthur T. Vanderbilt, 3 eminent practitioner,
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legal educator, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey. Chief Justice Vanderbilt, speaking on the occasion of
the laying of the cornerstone of the Law Center at New York
University, said: 4
I have in mind an undergraduate school in which,
from the outset, the students will be concerned not
only with the principles of the law and the reason-
ing back of these principles, but with the know-how
of putting the principles to work. The law schools
of the country cannot continue to lag behind the
engineering and scientific schools with their
laboratory work, or the medical colleges with their
clinics. It is not right that young lawyers should
learn the skills required in the profession at the
expense of their clients.
Legal educators in general have been concerned about the
criticisms of the law schools for years. Dean Albert J. Harno,
eminent legal educator, agrees that "the most vocal criticism
of the law schools is that the training they offer is not
practical enough and this is not true only today, but has
vacillated from one period of history to another.5
Some critics have attacked the case method of teaching
on the grounds that it does not train the students to deal
with everyday problems in the practice of law. They contend
that students are not trained in dealing with facts, legal
planning, negotiation, draftsmanship, procedure and advocacy.
The criticism is a valid one--that there is a gap between what
the young lawyer learns in law school, and the skills demanded
of him in the practice of law. However, the lawyer should be
more th n a man learned in the skills inherent in the practice
of law. Dean Harno states further, that "in the last analysis
legal education has two related objectives--the training of
lawyers and the improvement of the law. . . ."7
In fulfilling these objectives, Dean Harno suggests that
educational achievement should be recurrently tested in order
to determine whether the law schools are doing all that can
be rightfully assigned to them. Educational achievement can
be tested through symposia and institutes with full partici-
pation of the bar.
Dean Harno quotes Judge Jerome Frank,8 an out-spoken
critic of legal education:
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I maintain . . . that something of immense worth
was lost when our law schools wholly abandoned the
legal apprentice system. . . . I do not for a
moment suggest that we return to that old system in
its old form, but is it not plain that without giving
up entirely the case-book method, and without dis-
carding the invaluable alliances with the so-called
social sciences, our law schools should once more
bring themselves into closer contact with clients'
needs and what courts and lawyers actually do.
Should the schools not execute an about face? Should
they not now adopt Judge Reeves' eighteenth century
apprentice-school method modifying it in the light of
the wisdom gained on the long detour?
As a solution to the whole problem of inadequate training
of law students in practical skills, Judge Frank suggested
"The Clinic." 9 The "Clinic" would be in charge of full-time
professors who have had a varied experience in the practice of
law and would cover the general legal services offered by a
law office. In this way, the student could get some experience
doing the things lawyers do in the way they are usually done
by lawyers.
There have been many other suggestions by critics as to
how the law schools can teach more practical skills. Some
writers have suggested a research program with reference to
specific problems furnished by a faculty adviser. Others pro-
pose the use of motion pictures of trials. Still others cite
the possible benefits of the teaching of practical skills in
each class to the extent to which the subject is suited. 10
Professor J. Henry Landman, outstanding writer, practi-
tioner, lecturer, and law professor, states flatly that the
young law school graduate is incompetent to practice his pro-
fession. He states that the problem can be solved by a
thorough revision of the law school curriculum with emphasis
upon the "problem method" of teaching instead of the tradi-
tional case method now used in the majority of law schools.1 1
The alleged virtues of the problem method are: 12
First, it improves the thinking of the practicing
lawyer when confronted with a client's new problem.
Second, it discourages the student from resting
on the decision of an abbreviated case but obliges
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him to research the problem to corroborate or amend
his temporary opinion.
Third, the bibliography in connection with the
problem teaches the students the pertinent law of
his jurisdiction, whether it be sound or otherwise.
Fourth, it instructs the student in legal and
extra-bibliographic method which is as important
as legal knowledge itself to the practitioner.
Fifth, it obliges the student to press into use
other branches of human knowledge such as economics,
sociology, and the like in the solution of legal
problems, not only for the client representation but
for his own participation in public affairs.
Sixth, it best trains young students to prepare
convincing memoranda of law, which have become the
grist of the law office whether it be an opinion for
a client or the basis of a brief in litigation.
Seventh, it provides students with experience in
written and oral English in which so many of our
college graduates are regrettably deficient.
Eighth, it helps destroy the traditional departmen-
talization of the law which is so essential in the
solution of a client's problems.
Ninth, it encourages students to respect court
precedents but at the same time, invites independent
reasoning for more equitable decisions.
Tenth, it tends to modernize the law of all
jurisdictions which are now encumbered with obsolete
and unsound decisions.
Eleventh, it is a more workable and efficient
teaching technique than the wasteful case-method and
permits of more law school time for revisions and
modernization of the law school curriculum.
The critics appear to be in agreement that many of our
young law graduates are not prepared to practice law--that
much of this deficiency is due to the inadequacy of the law
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school curriculum. But they do not seem to agree on the solu-
tion. Professor Landman frowns on apprenticeship as a means
of learning the practice of law. He says that apprenticeship
does not offer sufficient generalization and has proved to be
a failure. 13 Professor Landman suggests that if the problem
method is used instead of the case method, the time saved
could be devoted to training students in the preparation of
standard legal instruments; to examining complete trial files;
and to visiting actual trials in the court, all under the
supervision of law professors required to engage in the prac-
tice of law, or obliged to take periodic sabbatical leave of
absence to learn the practical application of the law. 14
Another major criticism of the law schools is that they
do not give adequate training in "Legal Responsibility."1 5
Several critics in this area contend that many law graduates
are not aware of the lawyer's public role. In the list below,
you will find a summary of some of the aspects of a lawyer's
responsibilities. These have been characterized as the public
role of the lawyer;
(1) Responsibility to command and exert the utmost
competence in the interest of the client.
(2) Duty of probity in the affairs of clients,
court, and fellow-lawyers.
(3) The preservation of the integrity of the judi-
cial process, and other forms of social order.
(4) Responsibility and integrity of lawyers as
community leaders on the national or world
stage.
(5) All-right conduct on national or world stage.
(6) The ultimate source of right conduct, whether
in secular terms or divinely given law.
All lawyers should use their abilities to improve the
profession, the courts, and the law. They should be prepared
to act as leaders within their sphere of influence and should
be prepared to answer the call of public service when it
comes.1
Whether or not legal ethics can or should be taught in
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the law school is a debatable question.
position that morals cannot be taught at
all, and that lawyers should not require
civic responsibility or good citizenship
cated person.
Some persons take the
this level, if at
more training for
than any other edu-
The writer takes a somewhat different view. He is of the
opinion that there are many things reprehensible for a lawyer
to do that a lawyer might consider quite correct from a purely
moral point of view.
For example, what would be morally wrong with a partner-
ship composed of a lawyer and an accountant? Indeed, why not
place a blazing neon sign in front of the lawyer's office
advertising his services as the best in town with the lowest
rates? The average layman would find nothing morally wrong
in these actions, but the legal profession would not permit
such practices. It is the opinion of the writer that one can
learn and should be taught what is considered to be technically
unethical by secular law, and avoid pitfalls where his moral
judgment might not protect him.
It may also be argued that a thorough knowledge of the
complete role of the lawyer should enlighten and in many cases
inspire some students without other stimuli to greater heights
in service to his fellowman.
In summarizing the criticisms of the law school, we may
say that, in general, the schools are really teaching "how to
teach." The young graduate, when he leaves law school, is
prepared to be a justice of the Supreme Court, but it takes
years of experience before he learns to be a trial judge or a
lawyer. 17
Legal educators, and members of the bench and bar are by
no means in full agreement with the critics who say that the
law schools are not doing their job. Many writers have ex-
pressed strong views in defense of the law school's curriculum
and the training offered. Among those has been Dean Harlan F.
Stone. 18 As far back as 1911, Dean Stone expressed some con-
cern about the proper functions of the law school when he
pointed out that the law school "necessary by contract empha-
sizes those functions of legal training of lesser importance,
or which possibly do not belong to the law school at all."
In the early days of legal education it was entirely by
apprenticeship. This consisted of reading law in a law office
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along with on-the-job training. When the law schools first
appeared on the scene, law school training was in conjunction
with law office training. Finally, the law school supplanted
the law office as an instrumentality for legal instruction be-
cause of its superiority in certain directions. 1 9
The law office and the courtroom are still considered by
many persons to be superior agencies for legal training in the
practical skills of the legal profession. Those who share
this view will probably agree with Dean Stone's statement that
"If . . . we attempt to do what the office can do better than
the law school at the expense of the training which the law
school can do better than the office, there is always danger
of economic loss, not to say of wasted opportunities." 2 0
The lawyer of today spends the bulk of his time as
counselor, draftsman, negotiator, and planner. Only a rela-
tively few of the profession now devote themselves to court
procedure and the trial of cases. 2 1 A student that is likely
to become a successful lawyer has the ability to bridge the
gap from law school to practice, some educators say. Dean
Harno put it this way: "An outstanding quality of the success-
ful lawyer is his capacity for adaptation to new tasks and his
ability to educate himself to meet constantly changing de-
mands.
Judge Charles E. Clark, former Dean of Yale Law School,
made a good case for the law schools when he said:2 3
I regard the repetitive attempts to coerce law
schools offering so-called practical training as
at best curiously naive, and in general at odds with
sound concepts of legal education. Such attempts
might be dismissed as a comparatively harmless and
not unusual professional baiting of the schools ex-
cept that law deans and professors are acutely at-
tuned to professional criticism and hence may be led
to waste their substance in doing what they cannot
do effectively and what if they could, would not
be pedagogically worthwhile. . . . I shall argue
that law school training is now efficient more so
than other types of professional education; that
there is no real basis for the criticism implicit
in this pressure for practical training; that the
latter is limited, partial, and fragmentary at
best; and that the present-day legal education in
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problem analysis and exposition and in thorough
documentation of sources is much more important
and valuable as well as more within the practical
competence of the schools.
In a direct answer to the charges made by Mr. Cantrall
that more practical training should be given in law schools,
Dean McClain, formerly of the Duke University Law School takes
the position that the law schools are offering enough practical
training and that they should not be expected to do the whole
job. 24
According to Dean McClain, law schools can and should
give considerable practical training and they are doing so.
Since law schools cannot do the complete job, it has often
been suggested that some probationary period or apprenticeship
be entered upon before taking the bar. Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and New Jersey have such a requirement. 2 5
In order to fulfill part of its obligation to offer
students practical training, Duke University Law School oper-
ated a legal aid clinic with student participation for twenty-
two years before it was discontinued a few years ago.
2 6
In picturing the future role of the law school in legal
education, Dean Griswold, of Harvard Law School, quoted Dean
Beale27 as saying:
. . . law Is not merely concerned with the past
and present. As the science of right, it is pro-
gressive, always open to betterment, always testing
its results in the scales of justice, always looking
forward to a juster (sic) world which is to come
through improvement and growth. It has a place for
enthusiasm of the reformer and the prophet; for its
constant efforts as we have seen, is not only, by
investigation to discover the truth, but by pro-
phetic persuasion to bring it to pass. It is at
once, historian, economist, philosopher, scientist,
and seer.
2 8
Further outlining the future in legal education, Dean
Griswold suggests that there will be a change in subjects and
problems of law from time to time. To cope with this, law
schools must teach background, method, tradition, and
approach.2 9 This is necessary because the law a student
65
learns in law school is not likely to engage the student's
attention when he becomes an experienced practitioner. It is
quite likely that the legal profession will tend to depend
more on theory than authority--the civil law approach.O
However, it would appear that Dean Griswold also believes in
some practical training when he proposes a continued struggle
with practical education and research in what actually happens
in a law office. 3 1
After considering both the criticisms and defenses of the
law schools as set out in this paper, perhaps it would be
interesting to give some idea of what the law schools are now
offering in practical training. The writer investigated the
stated curricular offerings of six selected law schools to
determine the extent to which practical training is made
available to their students. It is the opinion of the writer
that the law schools selected represent a cross section of the
better law school, and will reasonably reflect the trend in
legal education. The law schools investigated, and their
offering in so-called practical training (as interpreted by
the writer) are set out below.
University of California School of Law3 2
1. Moot Court Program
The moot court program, the purpose of which is to
develop the skills of advocacy, combines training in
the preparation and writing of briefs and in oral
argument of cases. (Offered in first and second
years.)
2. Introduction to Law
Legal research and legal writing including the prepa-
ration of legal memoranda and appellate briefs. (Re-
quired one hour, first year.)
3. The Legal Profession
Contemporary responsibilities and functions. . .
4. Selected Problems in Corporations and Partnerships




Study in strategy and tactics in civil litigation, in-
cluding trial moot court. (Two hours, third year.)
6. Selected Problems in Estate Planning
Selected problems in estate analysis and planning;
tax conscious drafting of wills and trusts utilizing
future interests, class gifts and powers of appoint-
ment; planning of insurance and disposition of busi-
ness interest. Primary emphasis will be on individual
work in planning and estate, from interview to draft-
ing of documents. (Two hours, third year.)
It is interesting to note here that all third year offerings
are elective rather than required.
University of Notre Dame School of Law3 3
1. Moot Court
. . . under direction of student body. First year
students are required to brief and argue at least one
case on appeal.
2. Estate Planning
The various instruments useful in estate
planning are studied and drafting of such instruments
is required. (Four hours in third year.)
3. Practice Court
Every student must participate in at least one jury
trial. Each Saturday during first semester, a com-
plete case is tried which follows federal rules of
civil procedure. Student counsel interviews parties
and witnesses, and prepares and files pleadings and
a trial brief. First year students are required to
be jurors.
The remainder of the basic skill can best be culti-
vated by actual practice of the arts involved.
Beginning with the second year, therefore, emphasis
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is shifted from the case method to the problem method,
whereby students learn law by using it in working out
specific legal problems. This gives the student in-
timate familiarity with the library and provides in-
tense training in the interpretation, adaptation and
creative utilization of the materials he finds there.
Northwestern University School of Law34
. . . . To this end we offer training
in the skills and traditions of the
lawyer's craft."
1. Moot Court I
Stated cases raising legal issues of current interest
are briefed and argued on appeal . . . brief writing,
oral argument, and appellate procedure are emphasized.
2. Moot Court II
Used to select team for National Moot Court Competi-
tion. (Optional.)
3. Estate Planning
. . . practical problems in estate planning provide
exercises in drafting and the basic material for
group discussion. (Four hours, third year--re-
stricted enrollment.)
4. Legal Clinic
Supervised field work at the Legal Aid Bureau of the
United Charities or in the office of an attorney to
whom the student is assigned; consultation with
clients, interviews with witnesses.
Drafting and filing of instruments, appearances in
court, examination of records, assistance in conduct
of trial and general office work. (Required of all
students not members of the legal publication boards.
Work may be pursued after completion of three terms.)
5. Professional Responsibility
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Essential and distinctive characteristics of the
legal profession; the concept of service; the lawyer
as an officer of the court; the organization of the
bar and development of educational and ethical
standards; a self-governing profession and its
disciplinary machinery; the role of lawyers in the
evolution of American institutions and organization
of the community of nations. Discussions with
members of the bar regarding the application of pro-
fessional ideals and objectives to practical problems
which arise in the course of individual and collective
activities of lawyers. (One hour, required.)
6. Trial Technique
Methods of proof, preparation of facts, selection of
jury, opening statements, direct examination, laying
of foundation for and introduction of exhibits,
objection to evidence, offers of proof, expert testi-
mony, hypothetical questions, cross-examination and
impeachment of witness, arguments to court and jury,
exercises in examination of witnesses and oral argu-
ment.
The Law School of Harvard University3 5
The school seeks as its primary purpose
to prepare for the practice of the legal
profession wherever the common law pre-
vails.
1. The First Year Program of Group Work (Required--no credit)
. . . The group considers a series of problems based
on the work of the first-year courses, involving such
lawyer's tasks as fact-finding, counseling, negotiating,
and drafting, and including in some instances questions
of professional ethics. Early in the year, groups of
twenty take part in preparing a case for trial, work
which leads to a model jury trial tried by faculty
counsel before a federal or state judge. Some
written work is assigned, but primary reliance for
individual research and writing is placed on the law
club. . . .
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2. Estate Planning (Advanced--two hours, spring semester)
Each student will be required to complete one estate
plan, starting with the initial interview with the
client and ending with the execution of the documents
required to carry out the plan. A paper on some topic
in the estate planning field is required, and sub-
stantial progress on the paper must be made before the
beginning of the spring semester.
3. Trial Practice (Elective--two hours)
. . . (A)ctive participation in trial. (Description
vague.)
4. The Legal Profession (Elective)
. . . History, ethics, organized bar.
The University of North Carolina Law School3 6
1. Pleading and Parties (Four hours--required)
. . . (I)ncludes drafting.
2. Estate Planning Seminar (Three hours--elective)
Individual investigation and report on problems in
property, estate, trusts, future interests, insurance
and tax law in relation to the arrangement and dis-
position of an estate during life and death.
3. Legal Writing (One-half hour--required)
Completion of research and writing case-note and
opinion of counsel or a brief.
4. Preparation for Trial (One hour--required)
5. Trial and Appellate Practice (Four hours--third year
elective)
Jurisdiction and service of process. Preparation of
the case for trial from the standpoint of both fact
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and law. Consideration of ethical problems confronting
the practicing attorney. Discovery and pre-trial pro-
cedure. Conduct of trial, motions for non-suit and
directed verdict. Selection and instructions of
juries. Verdict and new trials. Judgments and their
effects. Methods of review and disposition of case in
appellate tribunal.
The New York University School of Law3 7
. . . . (A)fter the first year, the case system of in-
struction is . . . supplemented by the problem method and by
an increased emphasis on legal writing. Although all three
methods are used in traditional courses, special problem-
method seminars, drafting seminars, and subject seminars are
emphasized, particularly in the third year.
Individual training in the use of law books and the law
library is given to each student early in his course.
As a prerequisite to graduation, each student must evi-
dence proficiency in the writing of law notes and legal
memoranda. One law note is required in each of the first two
years. The requirement for the third year is usually met by
writing of a special memorandum in connection with a senior
seminar.
With the co-operation of the bench and bar, a moot court
system, consisting of both appellate and trial divisions, is
in operation under the direction of a faculty adviser. The
students are given an opportunity to participate in the trial
of a case and finally to argue an appeal. The program in-
cludes the preparation of briefs in appropriate cases and
visits to the courts under faculty supervision.
Students of outstanding excellence in scholarship are
eligible for the editorial board of the New York University
Law Review which contains leading articles on legal topics
of importance, the Annual Survey of American Law, the Survey
of New York Law, student notes on special problems and current
cases, and book reviews. The Law Review, published eight
times a year, has wide circulation among lawyers and law
libraries. The experience in professional writing and edi-
torial work makes membership on the Law Review Board a valued
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honor for which competition is keen.
. . . (S)tudents with good reports are invited to part ici-
pate in the work of the Legal Aid Society, a branch of which
is situated at the Law Center. Under the direction of
attorneys of the society, the students interview clients and
aid in the general processing of each case to its conclusion.
In short, no effort is spared to give each undergraduate
the maximum of individualized instruction and to make the in-
struction rigorous and comprehensive to the end that the
graduate may be fitted for actual practice of the law and to
take his place in the community.3 8
1. Introductory Seminar (Required--two term hours)
Legal history, legal research and writing. The first-
year law note. Discussion of topics and problems
within the scope of first-year work to give the
student additional opportunity for participation in
legal argument and to increase his understanding of the
legal processes.
2. Law and Society (Subject Seminar--two term hours)
A reflective study of major legal institutions in
terms of social and economic conditions, with special
emphasis on contemporary problems. Essentially de-
signed to provide perspective and an understanding of
the role of law in a changing society.
3. The Legal Profession (Elective--two term hours)
Legal education and admission to the bar; organization
of the legal profession; legal ethics; relation of the
bar to the judiciary; problems of practice including
fees; the law of attorney and client.
4. Drafting Legal Memoranda (Drafting Seminar; elective--
two term hours.
Each student is assigned a number of legal problems
of the type that would typically confront a young
lawyer in the early period of his practice. The student
is expected to find the best possible answers, which
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he will present in legal memoranda. At the discretion
of the student, one of these may be expanded to meet
the second law-note requirement. Each student meets
occasionally with his section and frequently in an
individual conference with the instructor.
5. Problems in Conveyancing (Drafting Seminar; elective--
two term hours)
Prerequisite: a course in estates and conveyancing, or
the equivalent.
Problems involving real estate contracts; leases,
searching titles, examining abstracts, title policies;
closing title; imposing and removing restrictions;
financing. Exercises in drafting contracts, deeds,
and leases. (For lawyers without specialized ex-
perience.)
6. Problems in Drafting Commercial Instruments (Drafting
Seminar; elective--two term hours)
Methods used in the preparation of contracts and other
common commercial instruments. Students are expected
to find the solution of various problems and to draft
appropriate legal documents.
7. Trial Practice (Drafting Seminar; elective-two term
hours)
A seminar on the trial of a civil law suit from original
interview and pleadings to trial and final judgment;
some emphasis on the technique of introducing evidence.
The foregoing data show the curricular offerings of
several outstanding law schools. These offerings, in the
opinion of the writer, may be classified as practical train-
ing. If we assume that this is a valid cross-section of law
schools in general, then we can say that it appears that the
law schools are concerned with the practical training of its
students at least to some degree.
In this paper, the writer has tried to review the opposing
positions taken by different writers on the question of
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whether or not the law schools should place more emphasis on
the so-called practical skills. He has further tried to show
curricular offerings of certain selected law schools, offer-
ings which, in his opinion, can be classified as practical
training.
It seems to this writer that the validity of the arguments
of those who would castigate and those who would defend the
law schools on this issue depends upon whether or not the task
of the law school has been properly assigned. What is the
proper and reasonable responsibility of the school toward its
graduates? Is it the job of the law school to merely train
lawyers, or should it strive to go further, building a solid
background upon which the legal scholar can deal with newer
and more complex problems as they arise? In other words,
should the law school place its emphasis upon training lawyers
or legal scholars?
Since the law school has taken over the responsibility of
the legal education of lawyers, then, indeed, it should be
obliged to teach what it purposes to teach--all the necessary
phases of legal education which it can practically do.
One educator and member of the bench stated this view in
no uncertain terms when he said, "The first task of a great
law school is to produce great lawyers. Such part of the
process as they cannot induce the schools, the colleges, or
the students themselves to do, they must perforce stand
responsibile for." 3 9
Since practical training is necessary, if the lawyer is to
become skilled in using the tools of his profession, the law
schools should make some provision for this training.
To what extent should the law schools be held responsible
for practical training? There are some who contend that upon
graduation, the law school student should be proficient in
the practical skills required in a general practice of law,
and that the public has a right to expect such proficiency.
Others say that with the proper legal background, basic know-
how skills are easily learned, and can be readily acquired by
the graduate after completing school; and further, that the
bar and courts can do a much better job in this area than the
law school. They further cite signs which they interpret as
being indicative of the fact that the trend now is for young
lawyers to enter established partnerships where they can
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learn know-how.
Perhaps the truth about what law schools can and should do
in the matter of practical training lies at a point somewhere
between the polar points of this continuum. In 1933, approxi-
mately sixty-six per cent of the practicing lawyers in this
country were practicing solo.4 0  It is reasonable to assume
that a large number--no doubt the majority--of them started
out alone. Even though the trend appears to be toward the
entering of established partnerships by young lawyers, or
association with older practitioner, a great many novices still
start alone.
In 1956, there were 176,000 lawyers in the active practice
of law in the United States. 4 1 It is not likely that this
number has decreased appreciably; in fact, it is more likely
that this number has increased. Therefore, one could reason-
ably say that a large percentage of this 176,000 or more
lawyers began practice alone, and that they received some of
their practical training at the expense of their clients, un-
less they received enough practical training in law school to
know how to protect the clients' interests, or at least recog-
nized personal limitations and the need for referral.
The writer, having been a solo practitioner of the law,
and having faced the myriad of problems which the young lawyer
surely must face, is of the opinion in general as a result of
the limited survey herein set out, that the law schools are
facing up to their obligations to the student. All of the
schools surveyed had some offerings of a practical nature,
and some had greater concentration than others. By virtue
of the fact that the problem method of instruction in suitable
courses is being used to supplement the case method in many
instances, it is further felt that the trend toward giving the
student more training in the basic practical skills will be
increased.
It is the opinion of the writer that some type of study
should be made to determine the kind of problems frequently
handled by a general practitioner. This could be used as
criteria for, or at least a point of departure toward
establishing a necessary minimum training program to impart
the basic know-how skills required to solve these problems.
The law schools should consider seriously the necessity
for fortifying the student by including in the courses, at
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least the minimum training in basic skills along with profes-
sional responsibility, and should make it a requirement rather
than elective. This is suggested because many students take
law with no intention, in the beginning, of practicing, but
subsequently, for various reasons, change their minds.
To further strengthen the law program, and to offset the
contention that the law schools do not have the faculty
resources to do a good job in this area because the professors
are more often not practitioners, there should be some drawing
upon the bench and bar for enrichment and enlightenment.
Seminars are useful means by which this can be accom-
plished. They should be well planned, under the direction and
supervision of full-time law professors, broken down into
specific projects of short duration, and should cover the
necessary field.
As time marches on, criticisms will prevail, but taken in
proper perspective, should lead to improvement.
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